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Greece: the self in transition, or maybe not? 
 
Efi Koutantou 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The current economic crisis in Greece affects young people in many ways, concerning both the 
socioeconomic conditions and their sense of self, which seems to face its own crisis. The 
sociocultural values, deeply embedded in the Greek self, are challenged too. The financial crisis 
has proved to cause a crisis of the self; society is in a prolonged state of suffering where young 
people are trying to plan for their futures. The paper discusses some recent findings concerning 
young people and families in Greece, their thoughts about the current circumstances and the way 
they think that they will overcome the constraints and develop their capacities. However, since 
the family plays an important role in the South Europe and in Greece, as well, the approaches 
used in recent research might need to be supplemented by a more psychosocial understanding of 
family ties, too. The second part of the paper proposes a psychosocial alternative of 
understanding the plight of young people in Greece and the role of their family ties in developing 
a mature personality while also living in a society at risk. The meaning behind the kinship ties for 
young people while they are trying to articulate their own action, is investigated. 
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Introduction 
 
Since 2008, Greece is experiencing a severe sovereign debt crisis and Greek people have 
become subjected to the severest austerity measures. Secure anchors of social and economic 
stability seem to have vanished, with nothing replacing them. Austerity, as is well known, has 
resulted in increasing work precariousness, reduction of the minimum wage and social benefits, 
fewer jobs for young people, and so on. It has also had a serious impact on health, with an 
increase in depression, health inequalities, suicides, etc. (Alexiou, Economou, Madianos & 
Stefanis 2011; Economou, Madianos 2013). Within this context, young people are facing serious 
limitations in their journey towards their future. Their perception of and response to the crisis is 
an emerging research subject in various fields, such as economics (Sakellaropoulos, S. 2010, 
Matsaganis, M. 2013) policy, politics and social sciences (Malkoutzis, N. 2011; Joseph N. Lekakis 
& Kousis, M. 2013; Verney S. & Bosco, A. 2013; Kretsos, L. 2014), etc. 
The first part of this paper discusses some recent research findings concerning young 
people and families in Greece. What are their thoughts about the current circumstances? How do 
they think they will overcome the constraints and develop their capacities? The second part 
argues that the research approaches adopted so far elucidate a more social or socio-psychological 
aspect of the problem and proposes another alternative, a psychosocial one to add to the 
understanding of the plight of young people of Greece and the role of the family for their future.   
 
 
 
Recent research 
 
Using a Giddensian model of agency and reflexivity (Giddens 1990, 1991), Chalari 
(November, 2012) argues that Greeks display a critical understanding towards both themselves 
and the situation they are in by acknowledging their own responsibility, whilst referring to 
specific mentalities that led to the present state of things, such as remaining passive and doing 
nothing. They now seem aware of the need to improve things themselves, without expecting 
solutions from external or foreign agents. The self becomes more reflexive, Chalari argues, as it 
leaves behind tradition, while facing more challenges and uncertainties. At the same time, some 
of Chalari’s interview participants showed nnostalgia towards certain values inherited from the 
previous generations and highlighted the importance of family, despite being critical about the 
mentality of their parents. Young people, Charali comments, experience disorientation, fear and 
anxiety while trying to create their own mechanisms to face the situation. 
In another study, Tsekeris (2015a) demonstrated the complex relationship between the 
individual and the collective suffering in the young Greeks’ response to the crisis. The majority of 
them lack the resources to survive the crisis on their own and are dependent on their families. 
Tsekeris argues that the loss of the social imaginaries that was developed during the postwar 
period, namely of economic growth, occupational stability and representative civil democracy, 
caused existential anxieties which tend to ‘dissociate the self’. Participants from research 
conducted by Tsekeris (2015a) consider themselves as part of the collective suffering, which 
echoes the failure of social support systems; at the same time, they showed signs of resistance, 
viewing the current crisis as an opportunity to adopt more self-conscious ways of thinking and 
behaving, giving emphasis to reciprocity and more relational ways of being based on solidarity. 
However, although the wounded self (Tsekeris, 2015) looks for fellow sufferers to make sense of 
life, this relational turn is directed towards their significant others and loved ones (namely the 
family) rather than the wider social community and civic engagement, as this research shows. In a 
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later research (Chalari, 2016), Chalari interviewed UK and Greek participants’ suffering and 
anxiety towards austerity; she found that most participants from UK described their suffering 
related to the impact of the welfare cuts on a more collective level, in relation to a class divide, 
while in Greek participants this suffering was expressed mostly individually and towards their 
loved ones.  
However, we should not attribute this ‘turn to the family’ to the economic crisis. Family 
was always important in Greece. Young people in Greece develop their socialization within the 
nuclear family, with little civic engagement and participation in voluntary associations (Chtouris 
2006). The family plays an important role in the welfare state of the young (Kretsos 2014: 110) 
and has always been a feature of the Greek economy. For instance, the family is expected to 
provide for the youth until the ‘appropriate’ job was found (Dendrinos 2014; Iacovou 2010). 
Small family businesses funded by relatives are also supposed to offer support or act as social 
networks in finding a job (Kretsos 2014: 110), and university students are generally reluctant to 
combine studies with work, citing low attractiveness of precarious jobs or voluntarism and 
preferring to rely on the family. Dendrinos observes: ‘it is obvious that apart from institutional 
factors that affect labor relations, we should also consider the sociocultural norms and discuss 
family ties, which also structure work attitudes’ (Dendrinos 2014). 
It could be argued that the greater reliance on the family may be a Southern European 
phenomenon, as some evidence shows for Greece, Italy and Spain (Bettio & Plantenga 2004; 
Bettio & Villa, 1998; 1999; Bagavos 2001; Karamesini 2008, Teperoglou et al,). The increased 
numbers of young adults residing with their parents in SE Europe has a negative long term effect 
in youth’s employability as it postpones their transition to adulthood (Chtouris 2006; Kretsos, 
2014). Until recently, young Greeks left the parental home at the age of 29 (Eurofound 2014). 
During the crisis independence is deferred for an indefinite future. Strangely enough, the majority 
of young people in Tsekeris’ study (93,3%) (2015b) “completely agreed with the statement that 
parents and children need to stay attached to each other as much as possible” (Tsekeris 2015b: 
15), to take care of the family. Although not engaged in collective social action, they consider 
social transformation possible through “solidarity, cooperation and volunteerism” (Tsekeris 
2015b: 19). In the context of late modernity, it is often argued that people have to engage in new 
concepts of agency and subjectivity (Bansel & Walkerdine 2010) and individuals have the duty to 
construct their own biographies (Beck & Beck – Gernsheim 2009; Giddens 1990, 1991). This is 
and is not the case in Greece. Kesisoglou (2016), examined how young people working in 
precarious conditions in Greece speak about their possibilities of emigrating as a path towards 
constructing their agency and subjectivity. They identified themselves as “effortful and 
entrepreneurial subjects (Kesisoglou, 2016: 1)”, who rely on their individual effort and agency.  
In recent research, Tsekeris (2017) discusses the phenomenon of Greek youth returning 
to the parental home (known as a Boomerang generation) after losing their jobs or finishing 
education and the disruption caused in their life-trajectories. They seem to maintain a traditional 
way of thinking which includes a linear life with financial and professional stability under the 
“state protection”. Their discourses with their peers support their belief that it was the 
institutional failure, which led them to financial dependence on their families. “Cohabitation with 
parents is perceived to be a multi-dimensionally defined option” as Tsekeris (2017: 42) argues; on 
the one hand, participants in this research claim that they have more to gain by staying at the 
parental house but, on the other hand, this condition “postpones the transition to the 
economically independent adult life” (Tsekeris, 2017: 42). So, young adults need to redefine 
expectations, which cannot be satisfied. Consequently, they may “follow a tendency for 
regression to a more closed self which may manage to realize intimate desires” (Tsekeris, 2017, 
pp. 42). Moreover, the return to the parental home creates problems for these people who need 
to renegotiate their status as adult and set their boundaries for privacy and independence.  
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An attempt towards a Psychosocial alternative 
 
From the few examples discussed so far, it becomes obvious that the Greek youth 
experience is interpreted mostly on the basis of reflexivity which refers to the individual’s ability 
to become critical towards themselves and society. Although social agents are indeed able to 
reflect on social change, this approach represents only one side of the story. In the case of the 
Greek society, it is also a matter of inherited systems and transmitted values especially within the 
family (Avdela 2002; Campbell 1964; Friedl 1962; Gallant 2001; Gallant and Honor 2000; Loizos 
& Papataxiarchis 1991; Paxson 1968) and in terms of its location in a given culture (Collier & 
Yanagisako 1987; Kaftantzoglou 1977). At this point it makes sense to ask: if psychic investments 
are formed through discourses within the milieu to which one belongs how easy is it for these 
values to be altered? How can one negotiate or challenge the so-called ‘individual responsibility’? 
Greece is said to be a collectivist society (Kafetsios 2006), characterized by strong in-
group shared values, which are used as behavioral guides (Kalogeraki 2009; Triandis 1988, 1989, 
2001). This is corroborated by older sociological research (Dragonas 1983; Doumanis 1983). 
More recent studies found people still focused around national and religious homogeneity 
(Georgas 1997; Kalogeraki 2009; Kataki,2012; Triandis 1988, 1989, 2001; Voulgaris 2006). It is 
also the case that Greek family policy reproduces the ideological assumption that the family is the 
main provider of welfare in society (Papadopoulos 1998; Tsoukalas 1987).  
One could argue that an alternative point of view, of explaining Greek youth experience 
may be necessary, focusing on the examination of the intensity of the attachment bonds, which 
could explain the attachment to the family and the power relations in terms of their location in 
Greek culture.  
As many of the research findings above show young Greeks not engaged in collective 
social action and their relational turn not to be directed towards civic engagement, one could 
argue that one of the problems in Greece may be the “abandonment of social responsibility”, a 
term explained by Altman (2005:3). “By social responsibility”, Altman means “the concern for 
the welfare of others in a larger society that leads one to take action of their behalf when their 
welfare is threatened” (Altman, 2005:4). Psychoanalysis could provide an analytical lens for 
addressing social problems and Altman tries to address the problem of abandonment of social 
responsibility psychoanalytically (p. 3). Various psychoanalytic theories explain this problem 
differently. In a Kleinian model, caring and concern for the other comes with the depressive 
position, from the reparative impulse to restore the fantasied destruction to the loved object, 
internal or external (Segal, 1964). In Winnicott’s theory, ruthless love is represented by the attack 
of the baby to the breast while guilt is represented by the concern for the damaged caused by the 
ruthless attacks (Winnicott, 1954: 89-100). In both theories, love and care is other-focused. With 
this relational context, there is a move towards transcending the individualism and the self-
centered human motivation in favor of subjectivity in modern “depressive society” (Rudan 2016: 
339). 
 However, according to Giannaras (1997: 27), a Greek philosopher, Greeks have not 
really the ability to embody this modernity principle of the priority of the Person, his rights and 
responsibility, the consciousness of Otherness, which also establishes democracy and neoliberal 
economy. Giannaras doubts that Greece represents a western-type of democracy as the country 
tries to organize a European state for more than 170 years and does not succeed in this, he 
continues (p. 27). He draws the problem in Greece’s cultural difference, which has been created 
from its Orthodox tradition. It seems to me that he argues for a re-discovery of the Orthodox 
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tradition and values, which, in his opinion, do not generate culture and cultural identity any more. 
The Orthodox suggestion nowadays is the priority of the Person and the consciousness of 
Otherness, as freedom but this notion is alienated (Giannaras, 1997: 27-30) by false 
interpretations and practices which capture its real meaning.  
In general terms, the inability to bear depressive guilt and the psychic reality of loss gives 
space to defences, like denial, to tolerate the pain. In relation to the function of capitalistic 
socioeconomic institutions as a system, we could speak of a sense of collective guilt emerging 
from group identifications that produce national feelings of pride or shame, common beliefs and 
fantasy relations around which members of groups are organized (Bion 1989). Future research 
could extend this idea to include manic defense behaviors on a wider group level that defend 
against or foreclose a sense of collective guilt. 
One could question what is the role of the ‘manic defence’ between an interpersonal 
relationship and the wider society. Altman (2005) argues that the ‘manic defence’ makes it 
difficult to care about others and therefore, it turns against social responsibility. In the case of a 
governing structure, the society’s failure in containment of anxiety (Bion 1962) and social 
provision (Winnicott, 1971) which may represent the provisions of the parental environment, 
generates losses to people as they feel less protected from the social environment; these losses are 
coming to terms people’s own limitations that can signify a failure. The Greek self, experienced 
as a failed one, is in conflict with the culture’s belief in its omnipotence and invulnerability, 
demonstrated in the need to seem as victorious and superior over other cultures (Peltz 2005). 
One could argue that the problem concerning Greek ‘parental environment’ may not be 
that of the absence of the qualities of ‘holding’ and ‘containment’ but, instead, the over-holding, 
over-pampering and over-protecting familial environment. Along the same lines, it would be 
possible to say that Greeks have not overcome the libidinal composition of the family. In 
“Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud: 1917), Freud shows how people may “never abandon the 
lost loved object, not even when a substitute is already beckoning to them” (Freud, 1971: 4); the 
libido is withdrawn into the ego instead of being displaced to an Other ‘object of love’. This 
‘regression to narcissism’ could be one part of the explanation of the merging with the inwards 
oriented protected environment with shared in-group values and strong bonds in kinship 
systems. These notes may show that psychic investments and inherited values is not an easy task 
to be altered and that the intensity of attachment bonds may explain the adult attachment to the 
family. Since people “may never abandon the loved object” (p.4), it is then difficult for them to 
care about others and therefore, it may show an abandonment of social responsibility. 
One could say that this is a psychoanalytic assumption, which may need strong clinical 
and cultural evidence if we wish to generalize for a whole culture. While this may be the case, we 
can initially ask, what is the element that differentiates Greece compared to other countries? 
Family dynamics may contribute to the maintenance of attachment styles from childhood to 
adulthood but I would argue that future research could focus on how the family system shapes 
the attachment styles of its members over time; the relationships between specific dimensions of 
family systems (family rules, behavioral patterns) and the attachment styles of young adults who 
are raised in those systems (Kiselica, M., & Pfaller, J. 1998). This question could find place if one 
investigates the historical evidence, which can better explain the so-called “collective force” or 
fusion.  
Another avenue of research could be exploring the ‘wider historical trauma’ as Greeks 
may feel that the recent crisis has been a ‘national disaster’ embodied through the history of wars 
and upheavals in Greece during the last 150 years; a trauma which becomes personal suffering, 
persisting and returning through the intensity of strong attachment which intensify the 
transmission of traumatic experiences. Frosh (2013: 120) views trauma as an unconscious form of 
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“haunting”; so, “we might have to see all identity construction as a mode of traumatic 
possession” (Frosh 2013: 120). 
These events are traumatic in the sense that they are not recognized as such, so they 
become repressed, uncanny, yet continuing to operate in the psyche (Frosh 2013:45). Only what 
is repressed can return with the force required to ensure neurotic attachment to irrational ideas 
and can act like our Superego/ external authority internalized as a sense of guilt (Frosh 2013:133-
134). “Our parents and intimates, all with whom we struggle are the ghosts that pass on their 
desires and expectations, that ‘haunt’ us and from whom we are inhabited” (Frosh 2013: 140); 
they carry all this unmanageable stuff which is found in history, in culture, embedded in the social 
structure that maintain the status of its living through (collective) memories. Nowadays, as the 
structures collapse in Greece, the younger generation loses the traditional points of reference or 
inherits them as traumatic.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Young people in Greece and their perception and response of the crisis is an emerging 
subject of research; it seems that their subjective experience begins to matter, to be researched 
and the results are meaningful to be published. This paper is to demonstrate and discuss the 
constraints that currently young people are facing while living in a society “in the middle”. 
Younger generation’s approach in the process of developing a mature personality is discussed. 
The effects of austerity, the delay in entering the job market before and during the crisis and the 
notion of precarity are further demonstrated, based on current research findings. Most of the 
narratives presented above show young people as being trapped in the sociopolitical milieu, 
hoping for a better future while some others try to adopt a different way of life. Some of them 
are identified with past beliefs; some others try to put their personal effort to improve their lives.  
This work is an attempt to demonstrate what is being left out at the moment in the 
interpretation of the way in which Greek youth tries to form an adult, independent life. As both 
older and contemporary research suggests, in the case of the Greek society, it is also a matter of 
inheritance systems and transmitted values, especially within the family and in terms of its 
location in a given society and culture. This approach is an attempt to investigate the 
interweaving of the social and the personal. The role of the unconscious, located in the intensity 
and maintenance of the primordial attachment bonds might explain the maintenance of the adult 
attachment to the family and would offer a first, tentative suggestion of unconscious processes. 
Borrowing psychoanalytical terms, it would also be valid to say that Greeks, even the younger 
generation, have never abandoned the libidinal position of the family; they still invest psychically 
in. They internalize it, identify with it as an ideal, as part of their own ego. 
In conclusion, when talking about Greek youth in transition, in their effort to articulate 
and create a life of their own in the middle of some difficult external circumstances, we should 
not ignore their internal state of mind, their early attachments, too; their influences, values, 
bonds, history and cultural origin. Researching history and culture in a given society may also lead 
us to revealing the ‘wider historical traumas’, expectations and desires from ancestors, which 
through the years, become personal suffering for the next generations, returning via attachment 
bonds, as an unconscious form of ‘haunting’. Many times, we may seem to struggle with external 
environment situations while, the real ‘war’ may also take place inside us, silently. 
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Abstract 
Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous (SLAA) is a Twelve Steps group that adopts the Alcoholics 
Anonymous tenets to control alcohol consumption, to regulate intimate relations. In this paper, I 
explore how the concept of sex and love has been shaped in SLAA and suggest some continuities 
and shifts in the perceptions of what is considered today pathological in relationships. First, I 
discuss the emergence of SLAA, its spiritual and therapeutic discourses and the constitutive 
problems of using a fundamentally spiritual and abstinence-focused program to regulate intimate 
relations. Adopting a Lacanian psychoanalytical point of view, I briefly discuss how the decline of 
some regulative traditions has altered the organisation of desire and created uncertainties in 
relationships. In that context, I then argue, the emergence and expansion of SLAA could offers 
members two things, first, a clear prescription of to regulate desire, and second, a safe space for 
the containment of unwanted emotions. Finally, I examine the experience of some SLAA’s 
female members and argue that despite of the program’s limitations, it still seems to offer a valid 
temporary option to manage the anxieties prompted by distressful relationships 
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Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous a Spiritual and Therapeutic Program 
 
Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous (SLAA) is an organisation which offers a program aimed at 
helping members to manage the anxieties of failed relationships whilst regaining a sense of 
agency. These are to be achieved by following the Twelve Steps 1program,a fundamentally 
spiritual process which was devised by Alcoholics Anonymous in 1939 (AA Services, 2002) to 
control alcohol consumption.  Since the mid 1950’s the AA’ s Twelve Steps program has been 
adapted to manage a myriad of conditions, from gambling and drug abuse, in which ‘there is a 
subjective experience of lack of control’ (Kurtz, 2010). Apart from the Twelve Steps program, 
SLAA’s recovery program draws heavily on its approved2 self-help literature (Beattie, 2013 ; 
Davis Kasl, 1990; Norwood, 2008; Peabody, 2011).  
In this paper, I discuss the emergence of SLAA, its conceptualisation of sex and love 
addiction and the constitutive problems of using an abstinence-focused program to regulate 
intimate relations. Adopting a Lacanian psychoanalytical point of view, I argue that the 
emergence and expansion of SLAA reflects the decline of some regulative traditions which has 
altered the organisation of desire and created uncertainties in intimate relationships (Bauman, 
2003; Illouz, 2013; Rowan, 2013; Soler, 2006; Verhaeghe, 2011). The program sets itself up as an 
authoritarian discourse with the power to fill the void left by the de-regulation of intimate 
relationships.  Despite its limitations, I contend that the SLAA’s program offers an important 
temporary venue to help members to manage anxiety, recover a sense of agency and have a sense 
of belonging. This paper attempts to offers insights into the program, what works and how.  
 
The emergence of SLAA 
The term ‘sex and love addiction’ emerged in 1976 in an Alcoholics Anonymous group in 
Boston. One of the group’s members coined the term to describe his frequent masturbation, 
impersonal sex, emotional dependency and extra-marital affairs. He concluded, via self-diagnosis, 
that he was suffering from a ‘new’ disease of ‘obsessive, compulsive, uncontrollable’ erotic 
 
11 THE TWELVE STEPS OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—
that our lives had become unmanageable. 2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to 
sanity. 3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him. 4. Made a 
searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves. 5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being 
the exact nature of our wrongs. 6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character. 7. Humbly 
asked Him to remove our shortcomings. 8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make 
amends to them all. 9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure 
them or others. 10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it. 11. Sought 
through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God, as we understood Him, praying only for 
knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out. 12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of 
these Steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs. Copyright 
 1952, 1953, 1981 by Alcoholics Anonymous Publishing (now known as Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, 
Inc.) All rights reserved. 
1 http://www.slaafws.org/download/core-files/The_Twelve_Steps_of_SLAA.pdf (accessed 02/02/2014) 
 
2 SLAA approved books: ‘Conference-approved literature at this time.  Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous neither 
endorses nor recommends the following books; they are identified only to provide individuals with the opportunity 
to learn about other material dealing with addiction to sex, love and relationships.’ http://slaaonline.org/books/ 
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impulses, which he called ‘sex and love addiction’. To ‘cure’ himself he modified AAs ‘Twelve 
Steps Program’ to focus on sexual sobriety rather than alcohol sobriety (Haaken, 1993).  This 
initial focus on the control of sexuality from a masculine perspective has now substantially 
changed. SLAA meetings and sex and love addiction is no longer addressed to men only, the 
majority of SLAA meetings are mixed (98 per cent as 10/2015) and out of control sexuality and 
excesses in love are conceptualised as being part of the same phenomenon.   
Since its inception in the USA, SLAA has grown worldwide3. Since February 2010, when 
I started my research, the number of SLAA weekly meetings in London grew from 18 to 43 (as 
measured in February 2016)4, an increase of almost 140% in a six-year period. The expansion and 
acceptance of the labels of sex and love addiction, and of SLAA itself, can be demonstrated by its 
adoption by the NHS. In 2010, the NHS added a section on its website where it explained the 
condition and offered links to Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous5. This clearly demonstrates 
both the endorsement of the program by the medical discourse and the views that not only 
sexual behaviour but also difficulties in love leads to levels of emotional distress that are deemed 
to require regulation. 
The current description of sex and love addiction by SLAA encompasses the concept of 
‘disease’, following AA, and places equal emphasis on issues of sex and love addiction.  Sex and 
Love Addicts Anonymous is also referred to as the Augustine Fellowship, due to the similarity of 
the symptomatology to that of St Augustine of Hippo’s work Confessions (Haaken, 1993). 
The following is SLAA description or definition of sex and love addiction: 
 
We in S.L.A.A. believe that sex and love addiction is a progressive illness which cannot be 
cured but which, like many illnesses, can be arrested. It may take several forms – 
including, but not limited to, a compulsive need for sex, extreme dependency on one or 
many people, or a chronic preoccupation with romance, intrigue, or fantasy. An obsessive 
compulsive pattern, either sexual or emotional, or both, exists in which relationships or 
sexual activities have become increasingly destructive to career, family and sense of self-
respect. Sex addiction and love addiction, if left unchecked, always gets worse. However, 
if we follow a simple program which has proven successful for scores of other men and 
women with the same illness, we can recover. 
(The Augustine Fellowship, Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous, Fellowship-Wide 
Services, 2010).6 
 
 The transformation of SLAA from a fellowship that mainly addressed uncontrollable erotic 
impulses to also encompass ‘extreme dependency on one or many people, or a chronic 
preoccupation with romance, intrigue, or fantasy’ can be traced back to the dissemination of the 
concept of co-dependency starting in the 1970s.  Starting in 1940s, in the United States mental 
health professionals identified that individuals (mostly women) who engaged with, or who have a 
history engaging with individuals with addiction, exhibited patterns of behaviour typified by being 
caring and supportive in ways that instead of helping the addict to stop problematic behaviour, 
contributed to its maintenance (Price, 1945; Whalen, 1953). These authors were influenced by the 
 
3Due to the anonymity at the core of the Twelve Steps Program, no official figures can be found about SLAA’s 
demographics. However, today SLAA is an international phenomenon, with meetings in many countries, including 
countries in Asia, South America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East, Europe, Australia and Oceania. 
http://www.slaafws.org/meetings (accessed 13/02/2016) 
4 http://www.slaauk.org/meeting-list/london-meetings/ accessed 09/02/2016 
5 http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/addiction/Pages/sexandloveaddiction.aspx (accessed 26/10/2013) 
6 (http://www.slaafws.org/download/core-files/ accessed 26/10/2013). 
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work of the German neo-Freudian, Karen Horney (Rotunda, 2001), whose theories were in 
vogue during that period in America.  Horney (1993) challenged the socio-cultural conditions 
which encouraged women to be dependent on men’s love, wealth, and protection, and developed 
the notions of ‘morbid dependence’ and ‘parasitical, symbiotic relationships’ as motivated by a 
‘drive for total surrender’, ‘to find unity through merging with a partner’ and the ‘drive to lose 
oneself’ (Horney 1950, p.258). 
During the 1970s, mental health professionals working with family members of alcoholics 
adopted the term ‘co-dependency’ to refer to the underlying motivations that were in play in the 
supportive and caring behaviour of the person contributing to the addictive behaviour (Cermark, 
1991; Cocores, 1987; Morgan, 1991; Roehling, 1996; Stafford, 2001).  
The first Twelve Steps program to incorporate therapeutic discourse was Adult Children 
of Alcoholics (ACOA or ACA) created in New York in 1979, three years after SLAA’s inception. 
ACOA was created by two female therapists who envisaged combining the AA philosophy with 
the use of mental health literature in order to manage the ‘pathology’ of attachment, referred to 
as co-dependence, which could be observed in some dysfunctional families. In the United States, 
ACOA has become a new idiom which articulates alcoholism as a family disease, a socially 
recognised emotional disability, particularly among women, and has had a significant impact on 
the field of mental health. (Brown, 2006; Haaeken, 1993).  
SLAA’s approved self-help literature refers to co-dependency, as one of the symptoms of 
sex and love addiction (Beattie,2013; Kasl, 1990; Norwood, 2008; Peabody, 2011). The 
propagation of the self-help literature on sex and love addiction is intertwined with the 
dissemination of the concept of co-dependence in self-help literature to refer to problematic ways 
of relating prompted by a dysfunctional background.  
  In the late 1980s, Codependents Anonymous (CODA) was created. This fellowship is 
very similar to ACOA, but it has a lesser focus on the role of substance abuse. It addresses a 
mode of relating marked by a need to help others who are immature, dependent, and 
irresponsible.  Co-dependency is also understood as a relationship addiction. The codependent is 
trapped in a dynamic which is emotionally draining and that enables others (not necessarily 
partners) to maintain problematic behaviour.  In CODA, inappropriate parenting is 
overcompensated for by an excessive need to care for others. (Haaken, 1990, Irvine, 1999).  
In England, CODA has only one third of the groups of SLAA (as of May 2014), as with 
SLAA majority of the groups are mixed. The main difference between CODA and SLAA is that 
CODA focuses on co-dependency whilst in SLAA co-dependency is only one of the broader 
range of difficulties in intimate relationships.  
 
 
 
The conceptualisation of Sex and Love Addiction in SLAA 
 
In order to better understand what sex and love addiction is for SLAA, I will refer to SLAA’s 
twelve characteristics of sex and love addiction. These were produced by members (like all the 
literature in the fellowship) and are arguably highly influenced by SLAA’s self-help literature.  
 
Characteristics of Sex and Love Addiction 
 
1. Having few healthy boundaries, we become sexually involved with and/or 
emotionally attached to people without knowing them. 
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2. Fearing abandonment and loneliness, we stay in and return to painful, destructive 
relationships, concealing our dependency needs from ourselves and others, growing 
more isolated and alienated from friends and loved ones, ourselves, and God.  
3. Fearing emotional and/or sexual deprivation, we compulsively pursue and involve 
ourselves in one relationship after another, sometimes having more than one sexual 
or emotional liaison at a time. 
4. We confuse love with neediness, physical and sexual attraction, pity and/or the 
need to rescue or be rescued.  
5. We feel empty and incomplete when we are alone. Even though we fear intimacy 
and commitment, we continually search for relationships and sexual contacts.  
6. We sexualize stress, guilt, loneliness, anger, shame, fear and envy. We use sex or 
emotional dependence as substitutes for nurturing care, and support. 
7. We use sex and emotional involvement to manipulate and control others. 
8. We become immobilized or seriously distracted by romantic or sexual obsessions 
or fantasies.  
9. We avoid responsibility for ourselves by attaching ourselves to people who are 
emotionally unavailable.  
10. We stay enslaved to emotional dependency, romantic intrigue, or compulsive 
sexual activities.  
11. To avoid feeling vulnerable, we may retreat from all intimate involvement, 
mistaking sexual and emotional anorexia for recovery.  
12. We assign magical qualities to others. We idealize and pursue them, then blame 
them for not fulfilling our fantasies and expectations. 
(http://www.slaafws.org/download/core-files/Characteristics-of-Sex-Love-
Addiction.pdf (assessed on 2/02/2014) 
 
These characteristics emphasise the addict’s difficulty in understanding and managing their 
emotions and the flawed ways in which they seek to have their emotional needs met. Their need 
for love and support is underlined by fear: fear of loneliness, abandonment and emotional and 
sexual deprivation.  According to this rationale, addicts present ambivalent psychological 
processes; they desire intimacy but at the same time fear it. They choose unavailable partners 
and/or idealise and invest in romantic and fantasy scenarios which disregard what the other 
brings to the relationship, the other’s subjectivity. They may also avoid partners as a result of 
their failure to confront and deal with their difficulties. They have problems setting boundaries 
and become dependent on others to fulfil their psychological needs.   
Since the concept of addiction is shaped around failed relationships, all the vulnerabilities 
and the motivations that are at play in forming relationships and bonds of love are understood in 
retrospect as pathological. The complexity of the psychological processes, contradictions and 
uncertainties between desires and ways of fulfilling them, vulnerabilities that arise from the 
experience of relating, and feelings of dependency, are not contextualised as being part of the 
shaping human relations. Healthy love becomes idealised as non-conflictual and rational. The 
anxieties and difficulties inherent to love are all deemed unhealthy and to be avoided.   Moreover, 
the SLAA approach implies that the causes of the failures of relationships have to be located 
within this specific range of ways of relating, disregarding the particularity of individuals 
symptoms and their dynamics.  
The group is important in the operation of the program. It has often been argued that it 
is only by framing the difficulties and dilemmas of the group as fundamentally similar that 
strategies can be put into place to overcome them. For example, Hochschild (1997) has argued 
that self-help groups teach members a new vernacular—what she calls ‘feeling rules’—to cope 
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with the task of managing emotions (p. 552). Antze (1976) has claimed that groups like SLAA 
create a unique ideology, involving the sharing of psychological problems and of possible 
solutions to these conditions, which could be preventative or curative. Similarly, Suler (1984) has 
claimed that the group’s beliefs help guide the group, diminishing members’ anxieties—it not 
only provides a way of understanding the condition, but also offers coping strategies that are 
advocated by the group.   
 
Spiritual and Therapeutic Strategies 
 
Like all Twelve Steps programs, SLAA is a fundamentally spiritual program, which means the 
only authority in the groups is ‘a loving God’ (Tradition 2), who may be present in the group’s 
conscience. The program revolves around members individually working the steps, participating 
in the meetings and helping other members. 
The steps have to be followed in a specific order: the first step involves admitting to be 
powerless in relation to the addiction. This step sets the recovery process, by acknowledging the 
problem within the group: ‘I am a …’ (add here the problematic behaviour, e.g. alcoholic, sex and 
love addict etc.). Denial is curtailed and the process of recovering begins. . This step reflects how 
most Twelve Steps meetings start: members introduce themselves by saying their name, followed 
by the statement ‘I am an alcoholic’ or ‘I am a sex and love addict’ etc., depending on the 
problem. Steps two and three involve the individual’s recognition of his or her self-centredness 
and the embracing of a higher power. This step entails changing the ways of relating to oneself 
and to others and embracing one’s spirituality. In step four, members are supposed to make a 
moral inventory, referring to difficult past experiences. Step five continues this process of 
reflection and acknowledgment of the problem. In steps six and seven, wrongdoings and defects 
of character are to be left behind and absolved by God. In steps eight and nine, members are 
supposed to reflect on and take responsibility for their wrongdoings and shortcomings. This is a 
more active process, in the sense that members are encouraged to ask forgiveness of people they 
have hurt and to make amends when possible. Steps ten to twelve are aimed at reinforcing the 
need to remain attuned to God’s will, to sustain sobriety, to reach others in need of help and to 
use the principles of the program in all spheres of life. Nowinski and Baker (2012) attribute the 
success of the Twelve Steps Program to the fact that it breaks down complex psychological 
dynamics into simple terms. Phrases such as ‘letting go’ and ‘turn it over’ help individuals deal 
with their lives in a more pragmatic manner. 
Meetings are considered the grounding place for the program and are rigidly structured. 
They start with members admitting their addiction. The acknowledgment of the addiction is 
considered the first step for individuals to accept and deal with denial and loss of control in 
relation to the addictive behaviour (Beattie, 2013; Nowinski and Baker, 2012). Members then 
read a piece from the fellowship literature and are able to share their experiences at an allocated 
time. Cross talking (commenting directly or indirectly on what other members say in the group) 
and personal opinions are not allowed. Members are encouraged to ‘tell stories, don’t give advice’ 
(Mullins, 2010, p. 152). There is no authority in the group and there are no top-down 
instructions; instead, management is led by ‘trusted servants’ who are encouraged to rotate 
regularly and all decisions are democratically discussed and agreed (Kelly et al., 2000, p. 18).  
Members are encouraged to have a sponsor, a more experienced member of the group, in order 
to have more dedicated support (Kelly et al., 2000). The function of the sponsor involves helping 
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the new member to set bottom lines (e.g. problematic behaviours to be avoided, recognising the 
triggers of the addiction), offering his or her own experience of recovery as a way of support. 
Here is worth to mention that bottom lined behaviour is to be completely avoided, that implies 
that sex and love addicts are to avoid relating until they have recovered a sense of agency, and 
have at least arrived in Step 8. The mutual benefits of members helping each other have been 
widely recognised. By helping others, sponsors further develop their coping strategies (Kurtz, 
1997 and Levine, 1988), feel better about themselves and their sense of control and competence 
(Mullin, 2010) and transform themselves from victims to helpers (Dosset, 2013)).  
In SLAA’s approved self-help literature, powerlessness arises as an effect of family 
background: individuals act out their past; they are powerless in relation to it, but can change 
their predicament if they identify what has caused or provoked the behaviour they act out. That is 
to say that by virtue of assuaging the power of the past in the present, individuals can gain agency 
(Beattie, 2013; Davis Kasl, 1990; Norwood, 2008; Peabody, 2011).  
This is very different from the ways in which powerlessness is articulated in AA, in which 
powerlessness is not related to family background, but is an unchangeable feature in one’s self; it 
cannot be worked through, only controlled with the support of the group and of a Higher Power 
(Valverde, 1998). In this regard, by adopting a therapeutic discourse, SLAA possibly contravenes 
what is at the heart of the Twelve Steps Program. It does not adapt to it, but rather, changes it 
from being a fundamentally spiritual program, to being a therapeutic and spiritual one.  
This has a significant effect on how the Twelve Steps Program is articulated in SLAA, not 
only in terms of philosophy but also in terms of outcomes. Whilst addiction, when seen as a 
spiritual disease, can only be ‘controlled’ but not ultimately ‘resolved’, addiction as a disease in 
SLAA’s approved literature is seen as a psychological condition that can be worked through. 
Individuals can change their predicament and can have fulfilling relationships, but on the proviso 
that they are guarded. 
The conceptualisation of addiction as an effect of a dysfunctional background permeates 
SLAA’s discourse. The addict lacks a proper template for love and is deemed to repeat childhood 
traumas (Beattie, 2013; Davis Kasl, 1990; Norwood, 2008; Peabody, 2011). In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920), Freud contended that what was at stake in a patient’s repetition was an attempt to 
master an original trauma and to turn passivity into activity; however, because the process of 
repetition does not entail learning, there is no working through, individuals continue to repeat 
without mastering their circumstances and without avoiding discomfort.   
It is this dynamic of the ‘repetition compulsion’, revealing the failed attempt to master the 
pains of the past, that seems to underlie the notion of emotional determinism present in the sex 
and love addiction self-help literature. Freud (1914) suggested that in analytical settings, through 
the process of transference, new meanings can be given to the repetitive symptom. Insofar as the 
analytical setting encourages the release of resistance, the unconscious material can emerge and 
be given a new signification. This process of giving new signification to the symptom is what 
allows the individual to stop repeating the past, and repetition is replaced by elaboration. In 
analytic treatment, attention is placed in the ways in which the unconscious material emerges, for 
example through slips of the tongue and dreams. This material is interpreted and gains new 
significations.  
Underlying SLAA’s discourse is the idea that unconscious forces are at play, determining 
the symptom; however, in managing the symptom in this way, SLAA’s discourse disregards the 
power of repression or the different ways that a symptom can be addressed in language. Instead, 
it demands that the ego should attribute meaning to the symptom. Although this is problematic 
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from the point of view of a therapeutic approach that takes into account the unconscious, it can 
be helpful in terms of providing containment and agency. Whilst it has been argued that, by 
virtue of giving meaning to lived experience, circumstances may become more contained, without 
anything really changing (Bruner, 1991), it is questionable whether it is true that nothing really 
changes, as shaping one’s lived experience in a more manageable way can be helpful in itself.  
In the SLAA context, however, because what lies ‘underneath’ persists and is never really 
examined, a spiritual dimension seems to offer a solution to that. The spiritual comes to account 
for all that eludes explanation. Whatever cannot be mastered by narrative control is to be 
mastered by connecting with the Higher Power. The function of the Higher Power is similar to 
what Lacan (1974) sees as the role of religion: it ‘appeals’ (or ‘posits’) to a cure and a meaning to 
that which does not work. However, to what extent can we ignore or dismiss the Higher Power, 
when it becomes a form of the containing Other, not a simple religious function? This containing 
Other is similar to Freud’s (1927) idea, that at the heart of religion there is a longing for a father, 
a protective father (paternal figure) who can assuage anxiety. Therefore, what seems to be at stake 
in the program is the wish for containment, in terms of giving a meaning to the symptom, 
appealing to a Higher Power that is ever-present. In this sense, it can be argued that despite the 
fact that the inclusion of the spiritual discourse within the therapeutic discourse contains its own 
failures and paradoxes, it nevertheless can offer a valuable strategy in moments of crisis. In my 
research, SLAA members interviewed seemed to benefit from the confluence of therapeutic and 
the spiritual strategies, the therapeutic as a means to understanding their difficulties and the 
spiritual as a way to contain anxiety and provide hope.   
I would therefore argue that the notion of the Higher Power in SLAA does not 
contradict the emphasis on rationality. Instead, it should be understood in terms of 
complementarity; what cannot be understood and contained by reason should be managed by 
relating to the Higher Power. In this respect, it can be argued that the notion of a Higher Power 
seems to provide a transformative experience—it can transform anxieties into manageable 
emotions and thoughts.  
Situating SLAA’s notion of a Higher Power within the Twelve Steps Program, the Irish 
psychoanalyst Rik Loose (2002) contends that the Twelve Steps offer a religious discourse, 
attempting to produce knowledge precisely where it is lacking, and in this process, closing the 
possibility of symbolisation. He contends that addicts have a difficulty in accepting life’s own 
terms and that the discourses of education, science, and religion on addiction often confuse cause 
and explanation. They all attempt to produce knowledge of the addict and where there is a lack in 
the domain of the Real, a hole that nothing can fill. This difficulty is accentuated by the fantasy of 
the existence of an ideal Wholeness; in other words, the idea that Eros can be separated from 
Thanatos.  
Loose’s (2002) argument can be seen as valid from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
However, it misses the point that the Twelve Steps Program functions within a robust discourse 
of ‘castration’: members are constantly reminded of their powerlessness and limitations. In that 
sense, it could be argued that the Twelve Steps do not separate Eros from Thanatos; Thanatos is 
very much the symptom in the context of the members’ weaknesses and failures. By extension, it 
seems to me that the notion of a Higher Power, religious though it is in origin, re-positions the 
‘good’ or positive aspects of subjectivity outside the perimeter of the ‘damaged’ or suffering self. 
It therefore creates a margin of hope. I would further argue that SLAA’s spiritual solution offers 
a valuable coping strategy, which members can always draw upon when their internal resources 
are not sufficient in managing distress and ontological insecurities. It gives a meaning to the Real, 
to the trauma and anxiety, to that that fails symbolisation, to that which words cannot contain, 
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and although the meaning it provides is illusory (Lacan, 1975); it helps individuals to manage 
difficult states of mind. In this sense, dismissing the Higher Power as merely religious misses the 
point.  
 
 
The De-Regulation of Intimacy and Narcissistic Defences 
 
It is important to appreciate the socio-cultural context of the twentieth century, and the time 
during which SLAA emerges and flourishes.  
According to Verhaeghe (1999), in the second half of the twentieth century, in Western 
societies ideals of freedom brought along expectations of a new kind of relationship between 
men and women; at the same time, science replaced church as the authority giving meaning to 
human experience. According to Jacques-Alain Miller (2012), the 21st century is being 
restructured along the lines of two prevalent discourses: the discourse of capitalism and the 
discourse of science. Miller argued that these two discourses have fundamentally altered the 
traditional organisation of human experience and consequently have devalued the Name-of-the-
Father7.   
According to the French psychoanalyst Marie-Hélène Brousse (2007) the growing 
emergence of scientific discourse has contributed to the waning of the structures that sustain 
authority in the symbolic domain. Today, signifiers that historically sustained authority have less 
power; as a result, the truth and authority they brought with them have become disassociated. 
For example, today, the power of the church and its master signifier, God, is not as mighty as it 
had been before and therefore truth has become more ‘logical and operational’. In the past, truth 
had been heavily linked to a larger symbolic system with master signifiers, such as God and the 
church. Today the boundaries are less defined by a Symbolic Order that tells us a ‘fundamental 
No!’. The main consequence of this shift is that boundaries assume a less phallic value and 
castration is more likely to operate from the order of the Real8, rather than on the basis of a 
symbolic process (Brousse, 2007, p. 10). Operating within the order of the Real means that 
because those boundaries do not come from an internalised Symbolic Order, their effects are 
arguably much less effective.  
The Irish psychoanalyst Alan Rowan (2013) has claimed that the modern family is in 
crisis. He has argued that modernity has promoted a shift from the two poles of parenthood to 
an exchangeable parity, a ‘monoparentality’, leading to the reduction of the family to the ‘parent-
 
7 In the 1950s, Lacan referred to the name of the father (without capitals) to allude to the original prohibitive role of 
the father against the incest taboo. Then from 1963 onwards, the Name-of-the Father became capitalised and took a 
more precise meaning, becoming ‘the fundamental signifier that permits signification to proceed normally’. As a 
signifier, the Name-of-the-Father has two main functions: to provide an identity within the Symbolic Order and to 
ensure the Oedipal prohibition of incest (Evans, 2007, p.119). 
 
8 In Seminar XXII R.S.I. (1974-75), Lacan refers to Freud’s text, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) to 
explain how symptoms are ‘the effects of the Symbolic in the Real’ (p.7), signifying something that does not work 
and has to be avoided. For example, an inhibition imposes a limit in an action, like a phobia does, or an anxiety. 
Therefore, both inhibition and anxiety are symptoms which have the function to protect by imposing limits in the 
Real rather than the in the Symbolic Order. Following this logic, inhibition, symptom and anxiety can function as 
names-of-the-father, creating a limit without a master signifier; that is they prohibit actions by confronting the Real. 
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child couple’, which favours a narcissistic and problematic relationship. That is, the child 
becomes an object – a source of enjoyment – and there is no symbolic narrative of the function 
of the parents, which would not only promote the identification with their ideals, but, more 
important, regulate desire (p. 8). This new narcissistic model of relating has been associated in 
sociological discourse to shifts in culture and society that have come about as a result of 
consumerism, a superficial therapy culture and the insecurities of late capitalism. These changes 
have allegedly been exacerbated by a lack of social mechanisms of recognition, fostering 
insecurity and leading individuals to search for external reassurance (Lasch, 1991; Craib, 2002).  
Žižek (1999) has argued that one of the consequences of the weakening of the prohibitive 
function of the Oedipal father is its replacement by the voracious father of Totem and Taboo 
(1913), conveying the idea that total satisfaction is possible. Because the prohibitive function of 
the Oedipal father is no longer fully operative, it loses both its ‘protective function’, as well as its 
purpose in providing a symbolic identity. Consequently, when internal barriers are no longer 
operative, limits are to be imposed from the Real. This lack of a symbolic identity can result in a 
poor sense of self, both creating anxiety and promoting narcissistic defence mechanisms.  
SLAA, it could be argued, seems to seek to offer an alternative for a lack on the symbolic 
domain. The program sets itself up as an authoritative agency, with the power of filling out a void 
in the Symbolic Order; it offers a supportive community, clear boundaries to regulate desire, and 
strategies to manage anxieties. Paradoxically, the program seems to encourage the same 
narcissistic mechanism of defence to remediate the anxieties brought about by changes in society 
at large. That is, SLAA encourages strategies of avoidance which similar to narcissistic defences 
aim to recover a lost narcissism and to promote self-sufficiency. Avoidance is promoted in two 
ways. Firstly, by rationalising emotions and the vulnerabilities that relationships prompt as 
addictions to be supressed; secondly, by promoting self-sufficiency and an investment in the self.  
SLAA therefore amounts to a paradox: on the one hand, the program cannot escape reproducing 
the same defences available in society at large, and in this respect it can be argued that it is a 
symptom of our time; on the other hand, the program seems to offer something very important 
to its members: containment.   
At the same time, the program has a robust discourse of avoidance – saying no to 
enjoyment, it offers important forms of containment: therapeutic and spiritual. It provides a 
meaning-interpretation to the real of anxiety, to that which cannot be articulated otherwise, a 
meaning to that which doesn’t work. It helps to assuage anxieties and promote feelings of hope 
which is so valuable in moments of despair and so underrated in many forms of treatments. In 
doing so, SLAA seems a beneficial program for individuals who identify with the symptom of sex 
and love addiction and wish to recover a sense of agency.  
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Abstract: Transhumanism is a relatively new, yet rapidly expanding, field of study. Converging 
technologies and the possibilities they create for various forms of directed (human) evolution 
give rise to potentially troubling political, social, cultural, and economic implications and 
numerous ethical dilemmas.  Part of my critique of transhumanism is that its thinking tends 
towards an instrumentalist view of technology, a kind of techno-anthropocentrism. That is to say 
that transhumanists underestimate the complexity of our relationship with technology, seeing it 
as a controllable, malleable tool that with the correct logic and scientific rigour can be turned to 
any end. Just as technological developments are dependent on the environment in which they 
arise, they in turn feedback into the culture creating new dynamics, often imperceptibly. One 
facet of investigation is whether transhumanism is likely to be inclusive. Analysis of the trend of 
disentitlement within advanced capitalism is an important aspect of this question. If the logics of 
progress (of economic growth and technological innovation) are the primary value in society, a 
pervasive sense of scarcity drives the competitiveness that yields the greatest efficiency, in part 
explaining the technocapitalist tendency towards increasing the numbers of surplus people. In 
this context, the systemic logic of advanced capitalism combined with the stark inequalities and 
excess populations that may exist outside of the techno-economic bubble of progress could be 
suggestive of a genocidal logic inherent within technocapitalism. The implications of exclusion 
from the system are likely to be far more significant in the future than they are today, but the 
system itself relies heavily on exclusions to augment its trajectory. 
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Julian Savulescu and Steve Fuller are two prominent transhumanist thinkers with very different 
justifications for and visions of human enhancement. Savulescu (2009, 2010, 2012) uses a 
distinctly secular view of humanity, which focuses on human moral failings and the existential 
dangers these cause as a justification for upgrade. His work has a distinctly biologically 
determinist bent, underplaying the complex logics of the social world and their impacts on 
individual and collective morality and the development and dissemination of technology. Fuller 
(2010, 2012, 2014) (aided and abetted by Veronika Lapinska (2014) in the The Proactionary 
Imperative, on which this article primarily focuses) rejects the plausibility of a secular 
underpinning to transhumanist aspirations, and views humans not as wretched moral failures 
doomed to extinction, but as nascent Gods destined for transcendence. Fuller and Lupinska 
(2014) show much more awareness of the prevailing social conditions in determining the 
development and outcomes of transhumanist technologies, even suggesting altering our current 
social world to maximise efficiency in progressing their transcendent aspirations. Whilst 
Savulescu promises that human enhancement can deliver us from evil and offer a moral and 
egalitarian future for the majority of humankind, Fuller embraces extreme social outcomes (that 
many would consider as ‘evil’) as a tool on the journey to omnipotence. The naivety of the path 
to human enhancement imagined by the former thinker is drawn into focus by that of the latter. 
The reasons for analysing the transhumanist ideas of Savulescu and Fuller are twofold. 
Firstly, the instrumentalist conception of technology enables transhumanist thinkers to underplay 
the moral dilemmas and practical hazards associated with radical technological developments by 
considering potential dangers independently and in abstraction. Such thinking presents a false 
construct: a simple problem, clearly delineated allowing for simple solutions. This characterises 
the evolution of the relationship between technology and man as deterministic, atomised and 
ahistorical. The process itself, like the technology, is perceived as machinic – complicated but not 
complex. In fact technological change, especially in the case of converging technologies with the 
potential to ‘upgrade’ human potentiality, is a complex and evolving process. The outcomes of 
various advancements are dynamic and fundamentally unpredictable as they interact with social, 
economic and cultural realities. As Capra & Luisi state, 
Twentieth-century science has shown repeatedly that all natural phenomena are ultimately 
interconnected, and that their essential properties, in fact, derive from their relationships to other 
things. Hence in order to explain any one of them completely, we would have to understand all 
the others, and that is obviously impossible (2014, p.2).  
Savulescu’s failure to fully recognise this in the ideas he expounds are drawn into sharp 
focus by the contrary ideas of Fuller & Lupinska, whose conception of morality is vastly 
different. 
The second reason for analysing the work of these thinkers here is to establish how each, 
in very different ways conceptually ‘dehumanises’. It is my contention that ‘systemic 
dehumanisation’ is an emergent characteristic of the interaction between the advanced capitalist 
system and the ongoing process of radical technological developments. Whilst such a wide-
ranging claim cannot be fully considered in the confines of this short article, the ideas of 
Savulescu and Fuller offer valuable insight into some ways that the application of transhumanist 
technologies and the ideologies that promote them may have deeply dehumanising impacts. It 
should be noted that the term ‘dehumanisation’ in this context refers both to individual humans 
and the concept of ‘human’ as a category. It is acknowledged that the relationship between these 
entities is itself complex, but holds that they can be seen as systems which interact upon each 
other. Thus the degradation of individual human rights undermines attempts to hold the category 
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of ‘human’ as a morally sacrosanct or valuable entity, and likewise the debasement of the moral 
value ascribed to the ‘human’ as a category may have real life impacts on individual humans.  
 
 
Transhumanism – an instrumentalist idea 
 
‘Transhumanism’ is the idea that humans should transcend their current natural state and 
limitations through the use of technology. That is to say we should embrace self-directed human 
evolution. If the history of technological progress can be seen as humankind’s attempt to tame 
nature to better serve its needs, transhumanism is the logical continuation: the revision of 
humankind’s nature to better serve its fantasies. David Pearce, co-founder of the World 
Transhumanist Association states: 
 
If we want to live in paradise, we will have to engineer it ourselves. If we want eternal life, 
then we’ll need to rewrite our bug-ridden genetic code and become god-like…only hi-tech 
solutions can ever eradicate suffering from the world. Compassion alone is not enough 
(Pearce, 2007) 
 
It is not a single cogent idea, but rather a broad church characterised by numerous schisms. Max 
More, founder of the Extropy Institute, calls it a ‘life philosophy, an intellectual and cultural 
movement, and an area of study’ (2013, p.4). However, in defining the term as ‘The study of the 
ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome 
fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in 
developing and using such technologies’ (2013, p.3), he underplays the faith inherent to the 
transhumanist position. Any investigation that deems the dangers greater than the potential 
benefits contravenes the transhumanist’s ideology. As David Roden states transhumanism is ‘an 
ethical claim that technological enhancement of human capacities is a desirable aim’ (2015 p.9). 
For them the aspiration to become a technologically enhanced post-human entity is morally 
sacrosanct. 
Transhumanism is a relatively new, yet rapidly expanding, philosophy and field of study. 
Its growing prominence is largely due to the rapid development of converging NBIC 
technologies (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science). 
These are giving rise to near future potentialities that have long been the domain of science 
fiction: superintelligence and life-span enhancement are very real possibilities. In some ways it 
may be wise not to view these developments as some far off radical break with all prior organic 
evolution, but as an ongoing process already underway. At a systems level above that of the 
individual human, many aspects of our social world, not least our financial systems, are already 
largely machine based entities. Algorithms and big data play an increasingly prominent role in our 
lives. Transhumanists would hold that the trajectory of technologies outlined above would 
suggest it is only a matter of time before they start to take hold at the level of the human. If we 
interrogate the complex systems and power structures in which this human / machine hybrid 
already exists, there is much to be learnt from recent manifestations of this evolving relationship. 
How recent technologies have been disseminated, utilised, and manipulated within the current 
global political, cultural and economic landscape can prove instructive. 
Due to the rapid pace of technological 'progress', the often Utopian language and 
expectations that discursively surround and shape our understanding of these developments have 
tended to remain critically under-interrogated. The tenor of much transhumanist thought 
dedicated to the profound changes that lie ahead is often characterised by abstraction. Often this 
is because the possible evolutionary ‘advancements’ are deemed so radical as to render the 
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prevailing social conditions irrelevant. Transhumanist thinking tends towards an instrumentalist 
view of technology, a kind of ‘techno-anthropocentrism’. That is to say, transhumanists 
underestimate the complexity of our relationship with technology, seeing it as a controllable, 
malleable tool that with the correct logic and scientific rigour can be turned to any end. In fact, 
just as technological developments are dependent on and reflective of the environment in which 
they arise, they in turn feedback into the culture creating new dynamics, often imperceptibly. 
Even if we assume the impending technological changes will bring about an extreme 
transformation of the very notion of humanity, it does not follow that all humans will be included 
in this process. What becomes of those outside the bubble of post-humanity requires thorough 
analysis. Furthermore, the nature and pace of the changes themselves do not exist in a social 
vacuum. The prevailing societal structures and cultural logics will play a significant role in this 
evolutionary process and its effects. Therefore, situating the ethical issues within the broader 
social, cultural, political, and economic contexts within which they emerge is vital.  
 
 
Savulescu – saving humanity with enhanced morality 
 
Humankind can be viewed as a creature desperately in need of salvation from the myriad dangers 
that pose an existential threat at the beginning of the 21st Century. Technology, especially of the 
sort that intervenes in our very nature, is increasingly looked towards as that salvation. As Marvin 
Minsky argues, 
  
we are unlikely to last very long – on either cosmic or human scales of time. In the next 
hundred or thousand years, we are liable to destroy ourselves, yet we alone are responsible 
not only for our species’ survival but for the continuation of intelligence on this planet and 
quite possibly in the universe (cited in Garreau, 2005, p.123).  
 
Even if we gropingly navigate our way to some kind of sustainable continued existence, 
Fuller points out ‘In the end, entropy conquers all’ (2014, p.29).  Savulescu also cites species 
survival as a primary justification for human enhancement arguing that we face a ‘Bermuda 
Triangle of Extinction’: radical technological power, liberal democracy and human moral nature, 
the triumvirate which threaten to represent a potential cocktail of destruction. Fuller & Lupinska 
charactarise the thinking of Nick Bostrom and Savulescu thus: 
 
The various diseases of affluence from which humanity sufferers today - from ecological 
degradation to mediocre health maintenance and tolerance of massive socioeconomic 
disparities - are traceable to a failure of our biological hardware to catch up with the 
aspirational software (i.e. the progressive philosophies, sciences, etc.) that successive 
generations of humans have programmed into the hardware. (2014, p.84) 
 
Their description is instructive; firstly, in its dehumanising, mechanistic language (perceiving 
humanity as something akin to a bug ridden computer system), but more importantly as it places 
morality as the particularly faulty aspect of human nature. 
Conceptions of ‘human nature’ are highly contentious, but it is in this area that Savulescu 
(2009) believes we have the greatest capacity to influence or alter the alarming future he 
diagnoses. Savulescu states that we have evolved as a species to exist in a world very different 
from the one we now live in (a localised Pleistocene hunter-gatherer community versus a 
globalised world of advanced technological power). This means our moral natures are at odds 
with the social world we now find ourselves in – we are empathetic, but only to a very limited 
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degree; we are near sighted, we tend to co-operate only in smaller groups when our efforts are 
observed and we are distrustful of strangers and naturally xenophobic (Savulescu, 2009). For 
Savulescu (2009), our inclination for short term thinking explains our slow reactions to climate 
change and ‘kin altruism’ or ‘the contract of mutual indifference’ can be seen as an explanation 
for the continuing existence of extreme poverty. It is worth noting that for Savulescu the causes 
of these problems are to be found within our biological wiring. There is no attempt to explain the 
complex systemic social logics or histories that play a significant role in their development. In his 
view, these integral failings at the moral core of human nature require technological intervention 
to prevent us from self-destruction. For Savulescu there is an ‘urgent imperative to enhance the 
moral character of humanity’ (Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p.1) exactly because radical 
technological potentialities are becoming possible. We therefore cannot wait for natural evolution 
to catch up with the shifting world we find ourselves in: it is too slow and lacks the requisite 
insight. 
Put in these terms, Savulescu’s panacea is inviting. The idea that we could simply upgrade 
ourselves into more benevolent versions of humanity may be highly appealing to a liberal 
imagination. However, deeper interrogation reveals a number of problems with Savulescu’s 
position. Firstly, rather than considering the myriad moral dilemmas that human enhancement 
raises, he oversimplifies the views of ‘bioconservatives’. He argues that all who view 
‘enhancement…as [a] threat to human equality and the fundamental dignity of man’ have just one 
criticism: ‘the basic concern is, I believe, a unitary one: the Argument from Equality’ (Savulescu, 
2012, p.184). It is highly dubious to characterise all potential critiques of human enhancement as 
essentially about equality, but Savulescu further limits the scope of enquiry by reducing the 
concept of equality to a ‘prescriptive ideal’: 
 
It is obvious, even to bioconservatives, that we are all born unequal…However, equality as 
a moral ideal is not a description of the way the world is or how people are, but an ideal of 
how people should be treated…The life of each person matters equally and should be 
treated by political institutions, the law and social norms equally…Bioconservatives worry 
that either the motivation to enhance, the act of enhancement or the result of enhancement 
will constitute or lead to people being treated unequally. How could this be so? Since 
equality is a prescriptive ideal, how could changing the empirical world affect the nature of, 
or the effectiveness of, a moral prescription? Since these are different ontological 
categories, it is puzzling how these writers relate one to the other’ (2012, p.185) 
 
By interpreting ‘equality’ in this extremely limited way, Savulescu precludes the possibility 
of an analysis of actual inequality in the real ‘empirical’ world as the real world belongs to a 
different ‘ontological category’ to ‘ideals’. He then proceeds with a brief assessment of ‘justice’ 
where he determines that giving people ‘a fair go’ is a satisfactory conception of justice, then 
conflating ‘a fair go’ with the prescriptive ideal of equality (2012, p.187). When it comes to 
‘intelligence quotients’ (itself a notoriously dubious analytical measurement), Savulescu uses 
quantified graphs and data, dignifying his analysis with a pseudo-scientific precision. And yet, for 
him, inequality in the empirical world, or for that matter, any analysis of how the world is or how 
its systemic workings function, would be merely speculative: 
 
Perhaps the bioconservative worry is a more pragmatic one. Perhaps they worry that the way 
the world is and the way people are, various enhancements will lead to people being 
unethically treated more unequally. This is pure empirical speculation without any robust 
evidence adduced to support it (2012, p.186) 
 
 41 
If Savulescu requires evidence that enhancements ‘will’ lead to the unethical treatment of 
people, then the only empirical evidence possible is the future outcome. By this rationale, we can 
say nothing about the future at all, as the only evidence for it has not yet occurred. However, 
whilst acknowledging the deeply complex social contingencies in which radical technological 
enhancements are likely to come about, it is possible to interrogate existing systemic logics, 
analyse already emergent phenomena and utilise this in any assessment of possible outcomes. We 
can also quantify, to some degree of accuracy, actual inequality defined in a variety of ways. 
When we consider the introduction of highly effective psycho-pharmaceuticals, genetic 
modification, superintelligence, brain-computer interfaces, nano-technology, robotic prosthetics, 
and even the possible development of life expansion, the global inequities we are already seeing 
will surely be magnified. It is not easy to conceive of a way in which these potentialities can be 
enjoyed and utilised by all when we consider the probable contexts and cultures in which they are 
likely to emerge. The implications of such potent and radical possibilities being available to some 
and not others are stark. Saskia Sassen’s analysis of what she terms the ‘emergence of new logics 
of expulsion’ (2014, p.4) is a particularly useful investigation at ‘capturing the pathologies of 
today’s global capitalism’ (2014, p.4). The expelled include the 60,000 migrants who have lost 
their lives on fatal journeys in the last 20 years (IOM, 2017) and the victims of the racially skewed 
profile of ever increasing incarceration rates (Shaw, D., 2015; Alexander, 2015; Nellis, 2016). 
Unprecedented acute concentration of wealth occurs alongside these expulsions. By 2017, the 
richest 8 people owned as much wealth as half the world. This figure is down from 388 people in 
2010. Meanwhile the wealthiest 1% own more wealth than the other 99% combined (Oxfam, 
2017). To dismiss the potential implications of such inequalities as ‘empirical speculation’ is 
illogical. Sassen argues that some of our ‘most advanced economic and technical achievements’ 
(2014, p.4) play a vital role in enabling the acute concentration and expulsions of surplus groups, 
whilst at the same time creating a kind of nebulous centrelessness as the locus of power: 
 
Historically, the oppressed have often risen against their masters. But today the oppressed 
have mostly been expelled and survive a great distance from their oppressors. Further, the 
‘oppressor’ is increasingly a complex system that combines persons, networks, and machines 
with no obvious centre (Sassen, 2014, p.10). 
 
Surplus populations expelled from the productive aspects of the social world may rapidly 
increase in number in the near future as improvements in AI and robotics could result in 
significant automation unemployment (Chase, 2016; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2013;). Large 
swathes of society may become productively and economically moribund. For Yuval Noah 
Harari such a prospect could mean that ‘the most important question in 21st-century economics 
may well be: What should we do with all the superfluous people?’ (2017). We are left with the 
scenario of a small elite which has an almost total concentration of wealth with access to the 
most powerfully transformative technologies in world history and a redundant mass of people no 
longer suited to the evolutionary environment in which they find themselves and entirely 
dependent on the benevolence of that elite.  The dehumanising treatment of today’s expelled 
groups show that prevailing liberal values in developed countries do not always extend to those 
who do not share the same privilege, race, culture or religion. History would suggest it is 
extremely naïve to think, given the likely difference in cultural worlds and even potential species-
defining variations between the elite and the rest, that such benevolence would be forthcoming. 
In an era of radical technological power, the masses may even represent a significant security 
threat to the elite which could be used to justify aggressive and authoritarian actions. 
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Another problem with much of Savulescu’s argument in Enhancing Equality (2012) is that 
his examples are focused on individuals and groups that are deemed substandard in some way. In 
the case of intelligence, he argues that those with an IQ under 97 may have problems ‘competing 
successfully in a global economy and exercising fully the rights and responsibilities of citizenship’ 
(2012, p.192). Savulescu’s fanciful suggestion is that: 
 
Cognitive enhancers could be used to correct inequality and give people a “fair go”. If we 
used cognitive enhancers to bring as many people as possible above the line of sufficient 
cognitive functioning, we would both be correcting natural inequality and social injustice 
(ibid.). 
 
Savulescu can only offer up such an unrealistic proposition because of his total failure to engage 
with the social reality in which these possibilities emerge. Leaving aside the contestability of IQ as 
an effective measure of intelligence (Weinberg, 1989), there is nothing in the logics of advanced 
capitalism which would suggest that enhancements would only be available to those with a 
negative ‘natural inequality’. As Yuval Noah Harari points out:  
 
Healing the sick was an egalitarian project, because it assumed that there is a normative 
standard of physical and mental health that everyone can and should enjoy…In contrast, 
upgrading the healthy is an elitist project, because it rejects the idea of a universal standard 
applicable to all, and seeks to give some individuals an edge over others (2016, p.348) 
  
Savulescu’s (2012) arguments predominantly focus on those who fall short of the normative 
standard in mental domains (such as psychopaths and those with low IQ). It is clear he thereby 
fails to engage comprehensively with the real social implications of human enhancement 
possibilities. By only discussing the egalitarian and uncontroversial project of healing those who 
fail to reach a normative standard (again bearing in mind the complexity of measuring normality 
in various domains of human capability), he does not address the more problematic issue of 
enhancements being more readily available to those in positions of power. Under the current 
social, political and economic logics, such enhancements are far more likely to exacerbate rather 
than ameliorate existing inequalities.  
Savulescu remains seemingly uninterested in the social world and unimpressed by analysis of 
the complex systemic dynamics from which the possibility of human enhancement is emerging. 
Despite this he is totally convinced that human enhancement can solve any issue with those 
complex dynamics:  
 
Our moral dispositions and choices create social inequality. One way to address that 
inequality is to change the dispositions of people who make those choices. After all, gross 
social inequality already exists. It is time to treat the cause rather than the symptom of the 
disease. And the disease is our limited set of moral dispositions (Savulescu, 2012, p.196) 
 
Savulescu simplifies all social inequality as being caused by human dispositions. But this 
ignores the fact that our moral dispositions themselves derive from social contexts. If ‘moral 
dispositions’ here refers to the biological wiring of all human beings, then it is a dubious claim as 
it ignores the social contingency of each individual morality, the variety of ‘moral dispositions’ of 
different people, the varying positions of power those people wield, and the systemic social and 
technological logics in which these individuals exist. Elsewhere, he is more cautious, stating: ‘It is 
important to recognise that embracing biological enhancements does not imply biological 
causation. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with employing biological solutions to social 
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problems’ (Savulescu, 2012, p.192). The problem here is that a lack of awareness of the roots of 
social problems may well result in biological solutions that exacerbate rather than ameliorate such 
issues. Whilst the failings of mankind to deal with global problems are increasingly manifest, deep 
social as well as biological understandings are required. Moral dispositions are neither self 
constituted (merely biological) nor all determining. Savulescu’s insistence on divorcing biological 
and social systems in his analysis underplays complexity and the inter-related nature of these 
complementary systems. Indeed systemic logics that determine vested interests and cultural 
norms play a significant role in how moral dispositions are shaped. Savulescu neglects to situate 
our moral failings within the wider cultural, political and economic context in which they occur.  
Secondly, it is necessary to consider how these technologies are to be disseminated, 
prescribed and potentially enforced in order to address the moral failings they seek to ‘cure’. 
Whilst it is easy to imagine certain broad mental enhancements such as intelligence would be 
desirable to people, the idea that ‘moral’ enhancements would appeal is more dubious. Setting 
aside for a moment the difficulty in determining exactly what we may mean by ‘enhancing moral 
nature’, it is clear that being more empathetic or altruistic may put people at a distinct 
disadvantage in the context of a competitive capitalist society. Many of the altruistic attributes 
that Savulescu wishes more people would exhibit would render them less attuned to a fitness 
landscape where a mantra is ‘greed is good’. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why arguing that 
human moral nature is bad per se is contestable: the advanced capitalist system encourages 
certain morally dubious behaviours. In fact human moral nature is extremely pliable and varied. 
Responsibility for the dissemination of moral enhancements would likely reside in the current 
power structures which may well bear much of the responsibility for these failings in the first 
place. It is important therefore to thoroughly interrogate the structures and tendencies that exist 
within our political and economic framework in order to identify the inherent biases within the 
system. It is these biases that will determine the development, design, accessibility and utilisation 
of technologies that Savulescu cites as offering strong possibilities for altering our failing moral 
nature. 
Finally, the conception of ‘morality’ may differ widely between groups. The logics of 
advanced capitalism play a role in determining the culturally accepted norms of morality also. In 
Savulescu’s work, although he speaks of promoting social justice and ‘good’ there is much to 
suggest his view of morality is a fairly socially conservative one. It is easy to conceive of various 
moral dangers that radical technological enhancement will create in the future but Savulescu 
tellingly focuses his attention on individual actors: ‘in the next decades there’s no reason why a 
backyard terrorist or fanatic or psychopath could not create a bio weapon that would at least 
destroy millions of lives’ (Savulescu, 2009). While such a reality is readily imaginable, it is worth 
noting the prominent position of terrorism in the public imagination of developed Western 
countries today and its relationship to the dehumanising treatment of migrants. As Harari points 
out: ‘Whereas in 2010 obesity and related illnesses killed about 3 million people, terrorists killed a 
total of 7697 people across the globe, most of them in developing countries. For the average 
American or European, Coca-Cola poses a far deadlier threat than al-Quaeda’ (2016, p.18). 
Terrorism, however, plays an important role in popularising certain policies that tend to cede civil 
liberties. Indeed, despite advocating ‘fixing’ human moral nature, Savulescu claims that the 
technologically enhanced threat from terrorists and other malign individuals requires the 
relinquishing of certain civil liberties including the right to privacy. Note in his logic advanced 
technology is both part of the reason for and the solution to unsustainable peril:  
 
we will need to relax our commitment to maximum protection of privacy. We’re seeing an 
increase in the surveillance of individuals and that will be necessary if we are to avert the 
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threats that those with anti-social personality disorder, fanaticism, represent through their 
access to radically enhanced technology (2009). 
 
Savulescu’s argument illustrates Shaw’s concern that ‘acquiescence to increased surveillance 
and regulation of the Internet is secured on the basis of the anxieties mobilised by the threat of 
terrorism, concerns about copyright theft and child protection issues’ (2008, p37). In fact this 
surveillance allows corporations and governments to access and make use of extremely valuable 
information. The subterranean ideological reasons for surveillance tie in to the technocapitalist 
system’s logic as it has transitioned to an information economy: ‘the ultimate commodity in this 
post-Fordist economic structure is information’ (Shaw, 2008, p27). Lanier explains: ‘troves of 
dossiers on the private lives and inner beings of ordinary people, collected over digital networks, 
are packaged into a new private form of elite money…It is a new kind of security the rich trade 
in, and the value is naturally driven up. It becomes a giant scale levee inaccessible to ordinary 
people’ (Lanier, 2014, p99). This levee is not only inaccessible but also imperceptible to ordinary 
people. Its impact extends beyond skewing the economic system towards elites with access to 
‘siren servers’ but also results in significant alterations to the conception of  liberty in that the 
authority of power is both radically more effective and dispersed. It is telling that whilst 
Savulescu proposes to fix social problems with technological solutions, he simultaneously 
advocates the loss of rights for individuals due to the social problems technology will bring. 
Savulescu ultimately sees human beings as a inadequate species teetering towards oblivion 
and desperately in need of redemption. By focusing on biological solutions instead of social ones 
(and failing to fully analyse the interconnectedness of the two) he offers an unconvincing surety 
that individuals will go unharmed as he works to justify the process that will redeem us: 
technological human enhancement.  
 
 
Fuller – The Proactionary Imperative 
 
Fuller & Lipinska (2014) give humans a more elevated standing in their advocacy for 
transhumanist interventions. Both acknowledge their ‘intellectual starting points’ as ‘non 
conformist Christians’ (2014, p.3) and deem that ‘Humans, understood either individually or 
collectively, are aspiring deities’ (2014, p.9) who are ‘aiming to beat the house in a cosmic casino 
where all previous players have come away broke…Homo sapiens know something that prior 
species did not, which may be to do with their special ties to the cosmic casino’s proprietor’ 
(2014, p.63). For Fuller & Lipinska then,  
 
to play God amounts to discovering our potential to become God, an entity who cannot be 
fully realised without our agreement to play the role. Our impulse to assume the divine 
position is evidenced in our ability to stand outside ourselves and adopt the standpoint of 
‘the view from nowhere’ (2014, p.59) 
 
Indeed, they acknowledge that ‘if you do not believe in the centrality of humanity to the 
cosmos - a distinctly Abrahamic theological preoccupation - then you'll find the message of the 
Proactionary Imperative difficult to hear’ (2014, p.8). Not least this is because they acknowledge 
that the history of human progress is ‘best read as adventures in ‘pyramid scheme’ finance’ (2014, 
p.8), ‘Thus, like more ordinary acts of faith, faith in science demands an active ‘suspension of 
disbelief’ (2014, p.9). Finally they warn that a rational analysis of history would render faith 
necessary to justify any transhumanist endeavours, arguing that if you believe in the cogency of 
human enhancement, ‘yet you see yourself as somehow poised ‘against’ or ‘beyond’ theology, 
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then you need to question the source of your confidence in humanity’s indefinite self promotion’ 
(2014, p.8). In other words, a belief in God is necessary to justify the belief that transhumanist 
aims will not end in catastrophe. For this reason, they reject Darwin, not for his theory of 
evolution per se, but for his failure to give humans a special, rarefied place in the natural world: 
 
Darwin himself seemed to think that our hypertrophied cerebral cortex, with its capacity for 
fixed ideas and inflated self regard, was a good candidate for the species killer. In short, big 
brains made for big egos that too easily amplify the significance of success and repressed the 
memory of failure. Thus, given the cosmic indifference of natural selection, our ever 
expanding and fetishised brains may turn out to be a cancer eating away at the human 
superorganism…The very idea that we might acquire a second-order, systemic 
understanding of the entire evolutionary process - perhaps transhumanism’s most 
fundamental epistemic assumption - is a collective psychic disorder symptomatic of the 
cancer’s onset (p83-4). 
 
This conception about humanity’s metaphysical ontology lies at the heart of Fuller & 
Lipinska’s justification for what they call ‘The Proactionary Imperative’, an ideological extension 
of the ‘proactionary principle’. The latter term was coined by Max Moore (2005) as a counterfoil 
to the ‘precautionary principle’ in the title of a declaration in favour of transhumanist aims. Fuller 
& Lupinska are clear in distinguishing these polar ideals and of the need to conceive of the 
‘proactionary’ ideal in a religious grounding: 
 
Both principles are, in philosophical parlance, ‘axiological’. They are concerned with values, 
specifically: what is a human being? The precautionary says that we are part of a larger 
whole called ‘nature’ and the meaningfulness of our lives (not to mention our sheer 
survival) is based on our appreciating that deep metaphysical point. It is all about self-
embedding. In contrast, the proactionary says that we are no mere part of nature; rather 
our existence gives meaning to an otherwise meaningless nature by serving as means to our 
ends. The precautionary wishes to return us to our biological origins, the proactionary to 
take us as far away from them as possible through endless acts of self-transcendence. This 
difference is ultimately grounded in the value of being human: are we animals suffering 
from too big brains (precautionary) or deities in need of more resources (proactionary)? 
(2014, p.99-100) 
 
To Fuller & Lipinska, the precautionary principle constitutes a ‘fall from Divine Grace’ 
(2014, p.31) by determining that there is a limit to our human powers, or to the notion than 
envisaging we are part of a nature that pre-exists us, and from which we are not separate, unique 
and divine. Hence for them, there is ‘latent misanthropy…revealed in the popular eco-
euphemism, ‘anthropocene’…as if the meaning of humanity were reducible to its carbon 
footprint’ (2014, p.31).  
As they conceive this ideological battle, our entire political framework should be 
reconstituted through an up/down proactionary/precautionary lens instead of the old right/left 
divide: 
  
people are increasingly affiliating across national borders and species boundaries…some 
even aspire to discover extraterrestrial intelligence…From this perspective, the basic 
dilemma that has defined the left right divide for the past two centuries - shall we extend or 
limit state power? - starts to look a bit stale (2014, p.38-9) 
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For this reason, ‘The precautionary-proactionary divide has the potential to shift the 
ideological access by 90 degrees…One group will be grounded in the Earth, while the other looks 
towards the heavens’ (2014, p.43). Through rationalising intellectual gymnastics (too banal and 
redundant to deal with here), Fuller & Lipinska claim the proactionary position as the ‘New Left’ 
and the precautionary as the ‘New Right’ (2014, p.13). However, they also characterise eco-
conscious philosophies (including ‘posthumanism’ as opposed to the proactionary 
‘transhumanism’) as the domain of ‘newer style leftists’ who adopt ‘an exceptionally precautionary 
brand of politics that treats virtually every enduring human imprint on the planet as a source of 
fear and loathing’ (2014, p.9).  
At the heart of Fuller & Lupinska’s belief system is that we are obliged to pursue 
technoscientific progress relentlessly and endlessly. The only cause to halt would be to reach our 
god-like destiny or infinite power, effectively to serve God by becoming God. It is in their 
attitude to failure along the way that the real tenor of Fuller & Lupinska’s aspirations are revealed. 
In stating ‘‘progressive” politics are dry runs at Universal governance that in practice do not 
always go to plan’ (2014, p.9), the euphemism hides a potentially brutal path to transcendence. 
‘Progressive’ here is not a substitute for ‘socially liberal’. On the contrary: ‘The proactionary 
principle is the 18th century enlightenment idea of progress on overdrive’ (2014, p.9). The term 
‘progressive’ has thus been co-opted to mean a fundamentalist proactionary ideal. The 
implications of such a mantra are stark: 
 
replacing the natural with the artificial is so key to proactionary strategy…some 
proactionaries speak nowadays of ‘black sky thinking’ that would have us concede - at least 
as a serious possibility if not a likelihood - the long-term environmental degradation of the 
Earth and begin to focus our attention on space colonisation (2014, pp.99-100) 
 
It is not just the Earth itself that would be allowed to fall victim to Fuller & Lupinska’s 
transhumanist super-experiment, but any person or thing that may represent grist for the mill in 
the transcendent journey. 
In The Proactionary Imperative risk is cast as an inherent good, as it is only through risk 
that humans may prosper. It is to Fuller & Lupinski what greed was to Gordon Gekko, the very 
life blood of their creed: ‘The Proactionary Imperative is about embracing risk as constitutive of 
what it means to be human: better to give hostage to fortune than be captive to the past’ (2014, 
p.3) and ‘Proactionaries define the human condition in terms of its capacity to take, survive and 
thrive on risk, based on some calculation of benefit to cost’ (2014, p.32). This latter nod to a 
cost/benefit analysis is perfunctory in the extreme and the term ‘calculation’ is deeply misleading. 
For Fuller & Lipinska the calculation is pure ideology not mathematics. 
 
For precautionaries, the value lost through species extinctions cannot be offset by however 
much room is thereby left to humans to expand their lives…proactionaries are quite open 
about their willingness to sacrifice a significant part of present-day conditions to enable the 
future to stay open (2014, p.26) 
 
This transcendent wager of gambling the Earth in the hope of winning the skies is propped 
up on divine faith alone. There is no attempt at calculating costs (what price on continued 
existence of Earth and mankind can be offered?), nor probabilities of success (although Fuller & 
Lipinska themselves acknowledge that logic alone would render the gamble a fool’s game as 
history shows us we are doomed to fail). Furthermore, success is valued as an infinite figure 
(Universal governance, God-like power, omnipotence) which would break any rational 
calculation anyway. The resident philosopher of the European Commission’s directorate comes 
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in for particular criticism for his work on ‘responsible innovation’ (2014, p100) as the 
proactionary ideology dictates than something very bad happening to you is preferable to the lost 
potential of something very good happening to you. The underlying logic to this dehumanising 
and misanthropic position is that being human is worth so much less than being superhuman that 
the incalculably small odds of achieving that status are worth the risk. Fuller & Lupinska fail to 
realise that even if we are to take their long term, transcendent aims seriously, those aims are 
completely undermined by a laissez-faire attitude to social, economic and environmental risk. A 
sustainable environment is a necessary platform on which to build transcendent goals. It is only 
blind faith that can cast these two objectives into a logical contradiction. These new political 
‘poles’ collapse in on each other when we realise that the first position is dependent on the other.  
The extent of suffering Fuller & Lupinska would be willing to gamble in their cosmic casino 
is only wholly manifest when we analyse what their project would mean for individual human 
beings: ‘a proactionary world would not merely tolerate risk-taking but outright encourage it, as 
people are provided with legal incentives to speculate with their bio economic assets. Living 
riskily would amount to an entrepreneurship of the self’ (2014, p.132). Furthermore, ‘even when 
things go horribly wrong, it is less an outright loss than a learning experience’ (2014, p.26) and 
‘proactionaries…seek large long-term benefits for survivors of a revolutionary regime that would 
permit many harms along the way’ (2014, p.101): ‘progress on overdrive’ will require sacrifices. 
The economic fragility that humans may soon be faced with may prove extremely useful to the 
proactionary goals: in a society where vast swathes of the population are entirely reliant on the 
State for survival, market forces would determine that the less the State provides the more people 
are likely to risk for a lower reward. Hence, ‘proactionaries would re-invent the welfare state as a 
vehicle for fostering securitised risk taking’ (2014, p.42) and ‘the proactionary state would operate 
like a venture capitalist write large’ (ibid.). Social justice and the promotion of equality is not a 
concern of the state here:  
 
To the proactionary, there is nothing intrinsically valuable in…‘equality’, despite its 
reputation as a postmodernist utopia. On the contrary, it looks like the enforcement of…a 
‘fragile’ approach to ecology that fails to recognise the creative power of destruction in 
both natural and human history (2014, p. 3-4) 
 
At the heart of this thinking is the removal of basic rights for ‘Humanity 1.0’, Fuller’s 
(2010) term for modern, non-augmented human beings, and the replacement of it by duties. 
These, in effect, constitute rights for the future augmented transhuman entity as they force 
modern man to make sacrifices with the intent of increasing the likelihood of enabling this 
‘Humanity 2.0’ to come into being: 
The classic welfare state’s loss of political salience reflects a massive transformation in 
humanity’s self-understanding, albeit in two diametrically opposed directions. Together they 
constitute the self-divided entity…‘Humanity 2.0’. Both sides in this self-division pull away from 
‘Humanity 1.0’, the entity enshrined in, say, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. One side pulls ‘genealogically’ to extend similar rights, concerns, etc. to those with a 
common evolutionary past; the other side ‘teleologically’, to extend similar rights concerns etc. to 
those with a common progressive future (Fuller & Lupinska, 2014, p.43). 
The duties that constitute future humans’ rights include that the very code of our being can 
and perhaps must be monetised: ‘Conceptualise our genetic material as property that one is 
entitled, and perhaps even obliged, to dispose of as inherited capital’ (2014, p.32) and ‘personal 
autonomy should be seen as a politically licensed franchise whereby individuals understand their 
bodies as akin to plots of land in what might be called the ‘genetic commons’ (2014, 69-70).  
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The neoliberal preoccupation with privatisation should thus extend to human beings 
according The Proactionary Imperative, a self proclaimed, ‘New Left’ movement. Indeed, the 
life-time of debt that is the lived reality of most citizens in developed advanced capitalist nations, 
takes a further step as you are born into debt:  
 
Simply by virtue of being allowed to live, you are invested with Capital on which a return is 
expected…you may not have lived up to your potential (i.e. the capital invested in you) by 
the time you die: you will not have provided sufficient return on (genetic, educative, etc.) 
investment. You fail to redeem your debt’ (2014, p107) 
 
Fuller & Lipinska refer to this as ‘a reinvent[ion] of self ownership in Humanity 2.0…[as 
an] abstract locus of agency responsible for the management and development of certain bio-
economic assets’ (2014, p.131). It is something of an understatement when they claim ‘Clearly 
employed here is a radicalisation of attitude toward the human’ (ibid.), but one not logically too 
great a leap from current systemic logics: ‘However specified, the ultimate goal in this bio-capital 
utopia is maximum productivity - making the most of one's inheritance’ (2014, p70-71). Socially 
moribund masses forced to serve the technoscientific super-project of Humanity 2.0 utilises the 
ideology of market-fundamentalism in its quest for perpetual progress and maximum 
productivity. The only significant difference is that the stated aim of ‘god-like’ capabilities is 
overt, as opposed to the undefined end determined by an ever more efficient market logic. 
It is fair to say, Fuller & Lupinska do not accept existing advanced capitalist logics in full. 
They identify some areas which may undermine their stated intentions (rentism and inheritance 
are deemed ‘socially corrosive’ (2014, p.74) and ‘irrational (aka traditional) socioeconomic barriers 
are likely to prevent some individuals especially of poor backgrounds from achieving [maximum 
productivity]’ (2014, p70)). Most notably society’s precautionary attitude towards science is the 
primary concern. Indeed, a significant amount of systemic change is needed: 
 
The real champions of transhumanism…are engaged in the process of restructuring the 
governance of the planet, if not the universe, to realise species level ambitions. Such 
restructuring will require not only fluency in manipulating the genetic code but also clever 
political, economic and legal mechanisms for adjusting to the consequences of acting on 
those ambitions, not least by providing compensation for the failures - including deaths - 
that are bound to occur along the way. It is only this global normative reorientation that 
truly deserves the title of ‘proactionary’ (2014, p.7) 
 
The principal intellectual offering put forward by Fuller & Lupinska by way of these 
economic and legal mechanisms is what they refer to as ‘hedgentics’, the wayward offspring of 
hedge funds and genetic engineering: 
 
The solution that respects both individual responsibility and collective interdependence can 
be encapsulated in ‘hedgenetics’, understood as a proactionary legal strategy that 
simultaneously addresses the scientific need to explore human genetic potential and the 
political requirements of genetic stewardship. This conceptual hybrid of hedge funds and 
genetics places genes in the realm of the economy as ‘bio-capital’ (2014, p.125). 
 
They further advocate bringing about a ‘war economy model’ impressed as they are by 
‘unprecedented feats of innovation by virtue of having to respond to a comprehensive yet 
unpredictable external foe’ (2014, p.106). Hence they wish for a kind of permanent ‘shock 
doctrine’, disaster capitalism on acid, whereby ‘the prospect of ecological collapse, epidemics or 
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even global financial meltdown [might] serve a similar function to focus minds in our own day’ 
(2014, p.106). Indeed, they even suggest science could be the basis of an alternative brand of 
loyalty to patriotism: ‘by replacing war with science, it may be possible to inspire people to absorb 
many of the same costs including personal harm or death in a less violent manner and for more 
reliable benefits to those who matter to them, now and in the future’ (2014, p.132).   
In case the harm and deaths they expect people to ‘absorb’ in the name of paying their 
‘debt’ for being ‘allowed to live’ is not morally dubious enough, Fuller & Lipinska, unabashedly 
embrace the eugenic nature of their ideology: ‘transhumanism’ - at least in name - owes its very 
existence to eugenics, whose spirit it continues to promote under the slightly more politically 
correct rubric of ‘human enhancement’ (2014, p.64). And indeed, in a distant echo of Savulescu’s 
rejection of privacy in favour of security Fuller & Lupinska acknowledge that ‘eugenics requires 
mass surveillance and experimentation, with the understanding that many in retrospect may turn 
out to have been used or sacrificed for science’ (2014, p.63). However, like a PR brochure for 
corporate responsibility in the age of mass human experimentation, they assure us: 
 
Yes, this is eugenics, but [not] the classical state authoritarian version…Rather, hedgenetics 
would be a kind of participatory eugenics, a democratically accountable, legally binding 
version of eugenics written into the heart of intellectual property law and the regulation of 
financial transactions. (2014, p128) 
 
Presumably the ideology is global – for maximum productivity proactionaries need as many 
people as possible. After all, ‘proactionaries are happy to increase the planet’s human population 
indefinitely as nothing more or less than a series of experiments in living, regardless of outcomes’ 
(2014, p.43). How Fuller & Lupinska ensure democratic accountability across the planet or what 
takes precedence when democracy threatens to limit productivity they do not say. Likewise, there 
is no mention of the implications of the significant social and economic inequities that would 
arise from such a state of precarity in terms of the democratic deficit caused by such skewed 
power relations.  
The only real problem they perceive is ‘how to promote a climate of tolerance in a society 
whose members are no longer compelled by a sense of common ancestry and are inclined to veer 
into increasingly divergent futures’ (2014, p.134). If we ignore the homogenising tendencies of 
capitalism and accept divergent futures based on broad experimental diversity leading to the most 
productive outcomes (somehow achieved democratically!), indeed the issue of tolerance in a 
world where we may see each other effectively as different species is worth concern. Such a 
world could also promote a constant sense of angst and inadequacy: 
 
The transhumanist philosophy of ‘ableism’ offers important insight into the emerging 
normative horizons of the proactionary world. It argues that in a world where mental and 
physical enhancement will become more common place, we should expect people’s self 
understanding to shift to an existential condition of ‘being always already disabled’, if only 
by virtue of not having undergone the latest popular treatment. As a result, something that 
modern society had taken for granted for so long - a stable sense of norms in terms of 
which people might orient their actions and on the basis of which they might claim 
entitlement or register grievance - would disappear… Failure in this task might result in 
formally recognised sub speciation: Apartheid 2.0 (2014, p.135) 
 
In reality, the horse may already have bolted on Apartheid 2.0 well before we get to 
‘ableism’ as a potential genocidal concern in the societal structure advocated in The Proactionary 
Imperative. Presumably genocide would only be a serious concern for proactionaries if it inhibits 
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progress towards the desired transcendent aim – perhaps by reducing the number of people 
available for experimentation. It is worth reflecting once more on Savulescu’s simplistic notion of 
‘moral upgrade’, and the contestability of the term morality. Such a ‘moral upgrade’ for Fuller & 
Lupinska would simply mean making humans more compliant and amenable to whatever enables 
the greatest efficiency in realising our transcendent trajectory. 
Whilst Fuller & Lupinska’s controversial tract may not be something most transhumanists 
would advocate in full, it is important nevertheless, as it does represent a rational transhumanist 
ideology, building on existing market logics, and legal and political structures. Its grain runs more 
aligned to advanced capitalism than against it, only adding an external overriding moral impulse 
(infinite progress towards omnipotence), which directs all vested interests within the system. 
Whilst Fuller & Lupinska would argue that they dignify man with a superior, indeed divine, 
purpose in the Universe, the implications for ‘Humanity 1.0’ (unaugmented modern humans) 
would be devastating and deeply dehumanising.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reason for analysing the transhumanist ideas of Savulescu and Fuller is not just to show how 
individuals are under significant threat from the proposals of both thinkers but to establish how 
each, in very different ways conceptually ‘dehumanises’. For Savulescu, humans are evolutionary 
relics – morally stunted entities ill fitting for the modern world. Whilst it is hard, in many ways 
not to agree with him, given the parlous state we find ourselves in, it should be noted that 
Savulescu puts all blame squarely within the moral core of each and every individual, all of whom 
need fixing. He offers no recognition of the social contingency of human moral failings. We are 
biologically, not systemically damned. We all offer such a threat to ourselves and each other that 
we cannot possibly be trusted and must give up all rights to privacy: the fault is with us, not the 
technology that heightens our potential for destruction or the social systems that enable it. For 
Fuller, we are nascent Gods – but this conception too renders us ‘dehumanised’ as our current 
manifestation is simply a disposable stepping stone on the path to divinity. Humanity is an 
iteration – an early one at that. We are Humanity 1.0, ripe for brutal and persistent 
experimentation and overdue an upgrade. Cultural conceptions of humanity are important. They 
are systems in themselves. Concepts can inform material reality just as capitalism’s ability to turn 
nefarious ideas and inert matter into priced and categorised entities has become globally manifest. 
Dominant conceptions of what it means to be human will therefore come to play out in the 
material reality of what we are to become, though refracted and filtered through the other 
systemic influences that interconnect with our destiny. 
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a) Selected Books  
 
• © 2017, ISBN 978-1-137-52530-7 
Intersectionality, Class 
and Migration 
Narratives of Iranian Women Migrants 
in the U.K. 
Fathi, Mastoureh 
 
This book offers critical analysis of everyday 
narratives of Iranian middle class migrants who use 
their social class and careers to "fit in" with British 
society.  Based on a series of interviews and 
participant observations with two cohorts of 
"privileged" Iranian migrant women working as 
doctors, dentists and academics in Britain—groups 
that are usually absent from studies around 
migration, marginality and intersectionality—the 
book applies narrative analysis and intersectionality 
to critically analyse social class in relation to gender, 
ethnicity, places and sense of belonging in Britain. As concepts such as "Nation," "Migrant," 
"Native," "Other," "Security," and "Border" have populated public and policy discourse, it is vital 
to explore migrants’ experiences and perceptions of the society in which they live, to answer 
deceptively simple questions such as "What does class mean?" and "How is class translated in the 
lives of migrants?" 
 
Review: This book fills an important gap in intersectionality studies and stratification studies, providing a nuanced 
intersectional analysis of the experiences, understandings and social position of Iranian women doctors in the UK, 
with a much needed focus on the importance of the role of class subjectivities and performativities. It advances 
understandings of social location and social hierarchy in both empirical and theoretical ways and is an important 
contribution to the burgeoning area of applying a gendered and intersectional lens within research in migration and 
ethnic studies. This book is essential reading for students, scholars, and professionals who are concerned with the 
complexity of othering processes and how they are dealt with by subjects and particularly how racialisation, class, and 
gender can operate in multiple and contradictory ways. Floya Anthias, Professor of Sociology and Social Justice 
(Emeritus), University of Roehampton University, UK 
 
Dr Mastoureh Fathi received her PhD in 2011 for the thesis, Classed pathways: Narratives of 
Iranian migrant women at the University of East London (UEL), under the supervision of Professor 
Nira Yuval-Davis. She is lecturer in Sociology at Royal Holloway, University of London. She has 
published on the topics of belonging, gender, education and social class among migrants. She is a 
narrative researcher with an interest in Muslim migrants, and their everyday experiences of life in 
Western countries. Her current research looks at the intersection of religion, gender and 
parenting.   
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b) Selected Edited Collections 
 
Futures and Fictions 
Edited by: Simon O’Sullivan, Henriette Gunkel and Ayesha Hameed 
Futures and Fictions is a book of essays and 
conversations that explore possibilities for a different 
‘political imaginary’ or, more simply, the imagining 
and imaging of alternate narratives and image-worlds 
that might be pitched against the impasses of our 
neoliberal present. 
 
In particular, the book contributes to prescient 
discussions around decolonization, post-capitalism 
and new kinds of social movements – exploring the 
intersections of these with contemporary art practice 
and visual culture. Contributions range from work on 
science, sonic and financial fictions and alternative 
space-time plots to myths and images generated by 
marginalized and ‘minor’ communities, queer-feminist 
strategies of fictioning, and the production of new 
Afro- and other futurisms. 
 
  
Paperback ISBN: 9781910924631 ($14.95 US // $15.95 CAN) 
eBook ISBN: 9781910924648 ($8.99 US & CAN) 
 
 
 
 
Dr Henriette Gunkel received her PhD in 2010 for the thesis: The cultural politics of female 
same-sex intimacy in post-apartheid South Africa, the University of East London (UEL), 
Director of Studies, Prof. Nira Yuval-Davis. She is lecturer in Visual Cultures, at Goldsmith’s 
College, University of London. She is the author of The Cultural Politics of Female Sexuality in South 
Africa (Routledge, 2010) and co-editor of Undutiful Daughters. New Directions in Feminist Thought and 
Practice (Palgrave 2012), What Can A Body Do? (Campus, 2010) and Frieda Grafe. 30 
Filme (Brinkman &  Bose, 2013). She currently works on a monograph on Africanist Science 
Fictional interventions. 
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c) Selected Journal Articles  
 
 
Alzeer, Gergana. 2017. Cocoons as a space of their own: a case of Emirati Women Learners. 
Gender, Place and Culture: a Journal of Feminist Geography. DOI: 10.1080/0966369X.2017.1352567 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on ‘cocooning’ as a spatial practice of Emirati higher 
education women learners in a singlesex learning context, which emerged from exploring 
the intersectional and intertwined relationship of gender, place and culture with its unique 
cultural formation that informs women learners’ spatiality. To understand women’s 
spatiality and explore these intersecting relations, I conducted an ethnographic qualitative 
inquiry, applying multiple levels of data gathering and analysis. I also utilised social theories 
of space as a theoretical framework, specifically the social construction of space and 
Lefebvre’s triad of perceived, conceived and lived space. Cocooning, represented in these 
women learners’ unique spatial appropriation in their quest for a space of their own, 
emerged as a pervasive socially constructed spatial theme. As a spatial practice, it was 
largely influenced by the women learners’ cultural model, including socio-cultural status 
and gender roles, rooted in their national, historical colonial and traditional past as well as 
current economic, political, demographic, academic-institutional and global positions and 
demands. Furthermore, cocooning is a spatial representation of what also seems a universal 
longing among women, beyond context and culture, for a space of one’s own. Such a 
spatial need is manifested differently in the perceived space while shared in the conceived 
and lived. 
 
 
Barbagallo, Camille. 2017. ‘Feminist Demands and the Contradictions of Choice: Work and 
Childcare in Neoliberal Britain’ Feminist Review, Special Edition: Women, Work and Value 
(forthcoming).  
Abstract: The development of 24-hour childcare in Britain is both the result 
of feminist struggle and, at the same time, indicates the significant transformations that 
have occurred under neoliberalism to waged work including the rise and proliferation of a 
typical working hours changes that have disproportionately had a negative 
effect on migrant and working-class women’s lives. This paper investigates how the 
politics of choice has been influential in structuring feminist and neoliberal discourses of 
women’s work and the labour of reproduction. It argues that while choice is central to 
feminist politics, it is via thediscourse of choice that neoliberalism enters the domestic 
sphere and reorganises thepractices and processes of reproduction and the subjectivity of 
motherhood. The paper returns to the different articulations of class and gender in 
the 1970s feminist critique of women’s domestic destiny as well as working-class women’s 
struggle for equal pay and employment to examine both the feminist demand for care 
and the subsequent expansionand marketisation of the childcare sector. 
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Fathi, Mastoureh. 2016. Becoming a woman doctor in Iran : The formation of classed and 
gendered selves. Gender and Education, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2016.1263290 
 
Abstract: This paper analyses the pedagogical pathways of a group of first-generation 
Iranian migrant doctors in the UK. It explores the complex system of class production and 
growing up as a classed subject in Iran, a process that ties young women’s educational 
aspirations to female independence on the one hand and to the modern feminine, 
heterosexual identity that sees women as part of the patriarchal family system on the other. 
By using Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital and habitus [Bourdieu 1984. Distinction: A 
Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul] and 
Foucault’s theory of surveillance [Foucault 1984. “The Means of Correct Training.” In The 
Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow. London: Penguin Books, pp. 188-205], this 
paper analyses how migrant women’s trajectories of becoming highly educated are 
translated into their roles as mothers. Three major aspects of pedagogical trajectories are 
identified in the formation of classed selves: the first is the generational surveillance within 
families, particularly of girls by their mothers; the second is the normalisation of pathways 
and the importance of destined pathways that separate certain families, practices and 
choices in superior positions; the third is the moralising of educational choices, which 
distance being a doctor from classed consciousness, giving rise to an altruistic self as 
opposed to a selfish one. 
 
 
 
Yuval-Davis, Nira; Varjú, Viktor; Tervonen, Miika; Hakim, Jamie; Fathi, Mastoureh. 2017 Press 
discourses on Roma in the UK, Finland and Hungary. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40 (7), 1151-
1169. 
 
Abstract: This article analyses the political and media discourses on Roma in Hungary, 
Finland and the UK, in relation to the local Roma in these countries as well as those who 
migrated from Central and Eastern Europe countries following the fall of communism. 
The authors have analysed left of centre and right of centre major newspapers in these 
three countries, focusing on specific case studies which were the foci of public debates 
during the last two decades. We also examined a common case study in 2013 (“blond 
Maria”) that was discussed throughout Europe. In each news paper, the constructions of 
Roma, local and migrant, and the changes to related discourses over the period were 
studied. In conclusion, we examine the multi-layered processes of social and political 
borderings in Europe which dominate discourses on Roma, “indigenous” and migrant, and 
the extent to which they constitute a coherent “European” construction of “the Roma”. 
 
 
 
Hameso, Seyoum. 2017. Farmers and policy-makers’ perceptions of climate change in Ethiopia. 
Climate and Development, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1291408 
 
Abstract: Climate change is one of the most urgent and complex challenges for societies and 
economies. Left unaddressed it contains the potential to compromise the well-being of the 
current and future generations. Smallholder farmers who depend on rain-fed agriculture are 
heavily affected and it is important to understand what they think about the problem and 
its impacts so that remedial measures can be tailored to address the same. Hence this study 
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explores how farmers and policy-makers in Ethiopia conceived climate change, factors 
contributing to it and its impacts. The study is based on a field research conducted from 
January to May 2012 in Sidama’s three agroecological zones (AEZs), namely, the highlands, 
midlands and lowlands. It deployed both qualitative and quantitative research method. 
Data collection involved (a) semi-structured interviews with 15 farmers and 17 policy-
makers, (b) focus group discussion with 30 farmers, and (c) a survey of 120  farmers. The 
novelty of the study lies in exploring and comparing two sets of views (that of local people 
and the policymakers) on climate change. Findings revealed that farmers clearly perceived 
climate risks based on their experience and knowledge of their local environment. The 
commonly cited indicators of change include high temperature, rainfall, seasonal shifts and 
incidence of certain diseases. Farmers also identified specific indicators such as change in 
wind direction, disappearance of plant (crop and tree) species, growing hitherto unfamiliar 
crops and emergence of new parasites and weeds. Their perceptions of causes of climate 
change are mixed: deforestation, God’s wrath, human activities, and weakened indigenous 
practices and values. On the other hand, participants from policy-making community 
espoused views shared by scientific discourse such as deforestation, global warming and 
CO2 emissions. The gap in understanding needs to be bridged by information and 
education of the local public with the policy-makers paying attention to the importance of 
indigenous knowledge. 
 
 
 
Johanssen, Jacob. 2016. The Subject in the Crowd: A Critical Discussion of Jodi Dean’s “Crowds 
and Party”. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. 14 (2), pp. 428-437. 
 
Abstract: This article presents a critical discussion of Jodi Dean’s (2016) book “Crowds and 
Party”. I pay particular attention to her discussion of crowds and the Communist Party that 
is influenced by psychoanalysis. Dean has put forward an important argument for the 
affectivity within crowds that may be transformed into a Communist Party that is 
characterised by a similar affective infrastructure. I suggest that Dean’s discussion of affect 
is slightly vague at times and may be supplemented with Sigmund Freud’s work on affect. 
In contrast to Dean, who stresses the collectivity and deindividuation of the crowd, I argue 
that the crowd needs to be thought of as a place where individuality and collectivity come 
together and remain in tension. Such a tension may then be managed by the Party, as Dean 
illustrates. 
 
 
Johanssen, Jacob. 2016. Not Belonging to one’s Self: Affect on Facebook’s Site Governance 
page. International Journal of Cultural Studies, https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1367877916666116 
 
 
Abstract: This article makes a contribution to a growing number of works that discuss affect 
and social media. I use Freudian affect theory to analyse user posts on the public Site 
Governance Facebook page. Freud’s work may help us to explore the affectivity within the 
user narratives and I suggest that they are expressions of alienation, dispossession and 
powerlessness that relate to the users’ relations with Facebook as well as to their internal 
and wider social relations. The article thus introduces a new angle on studies of negative 
user experiences that draws on psychoanalysis and critical theory. 
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Johanssen, Jacob. 2016. Media Research and Psychoanalysis: A Suggestion. International 
Communication Gazette. 78 (7), pp. 688-693. 
 
Abstract: This short commentary outlines psychoanalysis as a theory and method and its 
potential value to media research. Following Dahlgren (2013), it is suggested that 
psychoanalysis may enrich the field because it may offer a complex theory of the human 
subject, as well as methodological means of doing justice to the richness, ambivalence and 
contradictions of human experience. The psychoanalytic technique of free association and 
how it has been adapted in social research (Hollway and Jefferson 2000) is suggested as a 
means to open up subjective modes of expression and thinking – in researchers and 
research participants alike – that lie beyond rationality and conscious agency. 
 
 
 
Johanssen, Jacob. 2016. Did We Fail? (Counter-)Transference in a Qualitative Media Research 
Interview . Interactions: Studies in Communication & Culture. 7 (1), pp. 99-111. 
 
Abstract: Drawing on Joke Hermes’ (2006) account of a troubling interview, this article 
reproduces and reflects on passages from a qualitative interview with a user of a social 
networking site that was experienced as uncomfortable by both interviewee and interviewer 
(myself). The psychoanalytic concept of (counter-)transference is used to analyse the 
possible processes that led to the emergence of two narratives by the interviewee and 
interviewer and resulted in an unsuccessful research encounter. It is suggested that the 
analysis of the interview narratives may contribute to Wanda S. Pillow’s (2003) notion of an 
‘uncomfortable reflexivity’. It may further add to methodological discussions of the 
interview in media research by placing an emphasis on a complex theory of the subject and 
intersubjective dynamics. 
 
 
 
Malubale, Sanny. 2017. Rethinking the Effects of Identity Politics in a Multi-Ethic Society. A 
Comparative Analysis of Zambia and Kenya. Politikon, 44 :1, 49-71.  
 
Abstract: This paper is an investigation of identity politics and its relevance. It engages 
the 'instrumentalist model' in understanding the causal chains that can either stabilise 
or destabilise multi-ethnic societies. It employs a comparative case analysis of Zambia 
and Kenya. A substantial similarity in our cases is that identity politics has a hold in 
both nations and the extreme difference is ethnic identity cleavages appear divisive 
among Kenya’s elites, thus spilling into communities, whereas Zambia shows positive 
ethnic cohesion trends due to responsible elite conduct. The central proposition of this 
paper is that politics founded on identity fosters societal stability as opposed to 
instability. Politicised identities appear to promote division in a multi-ethnic society only 
because of instrumentalist causes. Thus, with the aid of cases, we analytically illustrate how 
and why ‘identity politics’ is not necessarily bad and we demonstrate its relevance in 
enhancing governing capacity which then translates into social harmony. 
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Vieten, M. Urlike and Scott Poynting. 2016. Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe. 
Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37(6), 533-540. 
 
Vieten, M. Urlike. 2016.  Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalisation of Gendered Anti-
Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37 
(6), 621-636. 
 
Abstract: The paper approaches the rise of far right populism in Europe with a feminist lens 
and on the background of the discursively constructed sexist and racist features of the 
current moral panic. It is argued that we can follow up a continuum of normalised 
culturalist gendered discourses in Europe, and for some time, in the Netherlands in 
particular. The paper is organised by looking, first, at the place of gender in far right 
discourses and the role of women in far right-wing populist parties. Second, a feminist 
critique of processes of normalisation is presented, helping to clarify the term ‘culturalism’. 
To illustrate the dynamics of gendered culturalism and the way it impacts the everyday life 
of Muslim women in the Netherlands, some interview sequences of an empirical study with 
female Dutch-Moroccan citizens are discussed. The experiences of the women illustrate 
how far right populist perspectives and prejudices entered their daily lives, and which 
counter strategies, the women used to resist intimidation. 
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Public events and research projects: 
 
 
 
 
 
Why do women in the diaspora matter in 
peace processes and policies? 
 
 
20 April 2017 
Amnesty International 
  
In recent years, diaspora women have had a considerable degree of influence on policy agendas in conflict-
affected countries on issues ranging from advocating for inclusive peace processes to pressing for sustainable 
development. Diaspora women, many of whom have been directly affected by war, often possess unique skills 
and first-hand experience of the local and global context and are well-placed to influence international policies 
in favour of women in war-affected countries. 
Please join WPP for the launch of ‘United Women for Peace’ an initiative of the non-profit ‘’Women for Peace 
and Participation.’’ The event will highlight the role of diaspora women leaders based in the UK but who 
continue to advocate for inclusive and gender-sensitive peace processes and in their home countries and the 
inclusion of their communities in policy making, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Kosovo, Libya, 
South Sudan and Turkey. 
Location: Amnesty International, The Human Rights Action Center, 17 -25 New Inn Yard, London, EC2A 
3EA 
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